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DUE PROCESS EROSION: THE DIMINUTION OF LIVE
TESTIMONY AT THE ICTY
MEGAN A. FAIRLIE*
"A paper trail is one thing, a paper trial quite another."
-Judge Patricia M. Wald, 2001
"[T]o sacrifice justice and accountability for the immediacy of
realpolitik and accommodation is to choose expedience over lasting
goals and more enduring values."
-M. Cherif Bassiouni, 2000
I. INTRODUCTION
Shortly after its creation in 1993, the International Criminal Tribunal for
the former Yugoslavia ("ICTY" or "Tribunal")' adopted an adversarial con-
struct and advocated a preference for the presentation of direct evidence, or
live witness testimony, in the proceedings adjudicated before it. Since that
time, the Tribunal has come under considerable pressure, from numerous
sources and for a variety of reasons, to expedite its proceedings. This article
examines the history of the Tribunal's establishment and identifies the fac-
tors that influenced the decisions made regarding its makeup. It then ad-
dresses the issues that have contributed to the delay in its proceedings, along
with the forces exerted upon the Tribunal to remedy that delay. In view of all
Admitted to practice law in New York and North Carolina; Doctoral Fellow, Na-
tional University of Ireland, Galway; B.A., University at Albany, summa cum laude, DBK;
J.D., Washington and Lee University School of Law, cum laude, LL.M. in International Peace
Support Operations, National University of Ireland, Galway, first class honours. The author
would like to thank Stephen M. Sayers, defense counsel before the ICTY, for sharing materi-
als related to the Kordic case. Geoffrey J. Canavan also deserves thanks from the author for
many things, including the provision of an office in which to draft this article.
1. The ICTY was established by the United Nations, G.A. Res. 827, U.N. SCOR, 3217th
mtg. at 2, U.N. Doc. S/Res/827 (1993), and functions in accordance with the provisions of the
Statute of the International Tribunal for the Prosecution of Persons Responsible for Serious
Violations of International Humanitarian Law Committed in the Territory of the Former
Yugoslavia Since 1991, annexed to the Report of the Secretary-General Pursuant to Para-
graph 2 of Security Council Resolution 808 (1993), U.N. SCOR, U.N. Doc. S/25704, at 36
(1993) [hereinafter Statute].
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of this, the paper assesses the Tribunal's Rules of Procedure and Evidence
and its jurisprudence, with particular regard given to the demise of live tes-
timony before the Tribunal. The article questions the Tribunal's commitment
to the principles espoused by it, discusses the Tribunal's potential for expo-
sure to criticism akin to that received by its post-World War II predecessors
and looks at the future of evidence before the ICTY.
II. BACKGROUND
In February 1993, in response to "continuing reports of widespread vio-
lations of international humanitarian law occurring within the territory of the
former Yugoslavia," the United Nations Security Council ("Security Coun-
cil"), by Resolution 808, decided to establish an international tribunal to
prosecute the perpetrators of the violations. 3 The decision to create the inter-
national tribunal, the first of its kind established in more than forty years,'
had the accompanying aim of distinguishing the tribunal from its Nuremberg
and Tokyo predecessors.' Rather than be perceived as an example of "vic-
tors' justice," the Security Council highlighted the international dimension
of the tribunal, particularly with regard to the acceptance of input from
Member States.6
2. International Tribunal for the Prosecution of the Persons Responsible for Serious Vio-
lations of International Humanitarian Law Committed in the Territory of the Former Yugo-
slavia Since 1991: Rules of Procedure and Evidence, U.N. Doc. IT/32, reprinted in 33 I.L.M.
484 (1994) [hereinafter ICTY RPE]. At the date of this publication, the Rules of Procedure
and Evidence were in their 28th revision. U.N. Doc. IT/32/Rev.28 (2003) at
http://www.un.org/icty/legaldoc/index.htm [hereinafter ICTY RPE revision 281.
3. S.C. Res. 808, U.N. SCOR, 48th Sess., 3175th mtg. at 1, U.N. Doc. S/RES/808
(1993).
4. See Christian Tomuschat, International Criminal Prosecution: The Precedent of Nur-
emberg Confirmed, 5 CRIM. L.F. 237, 238 (1994). Throughout this period of time numerous
atrocities were committed in territories located in Asia, Africa and the Middle East. See Rich-
ard J. Goldstone, The Role of the United Nations in the Prosecution of International War
Criminals, 5 WASH. U. J.L. & PoL'Y 119, 119-20 (2001) (implying that the commission of
such heinous crimes in Europe provided the impetus for powerful nations to finally take inter-
national action).
5. See Special Proclamation by the Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers, Charter
of the International Military Tribunal for the Far East, Jan. 19, 1946, T.I.A.S. No. 1589, 4
Bevans 20 (establishing the Tokyo tribunal) [hereinafter Tokyo Charter]; Agreement by the
Government of the United States of America, the Provisional Government of the French Re-
public, the Government of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland and the
Government of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics for the Prosecution and Punishment of
the Major War Criminals of the European Axis, Aug. 8, 1945, 56 Stat. 1544, 82 U.N.T.S. 279
(establishing the Nuremberg tribunal), reprinted in 2 VIRGINIA MORRIS & MICHAEL P.
SCHARF, AN INSIDER'S GUIDE TO THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL TRIBUNAL FOR THE FORMER
YUGOSLAVIA: A DOCUMENTARY HISTORY AND ANALYSIS 675 (1995).
6. Natasha A. Affolder, Tadi6, the Anonymous Witness and the Sources of International
Procedural Law, 19 MICH. J. INT'L L. 445, 449 (1998). Although the Tribunal's success with
regard to its attempt to avoid being perceived as representative of victors' justice is a matter
for debate, it is doubtful whether any amount of international involvement could counter the
claim that its existence derives, in part, from the fact that "sovereign equality of states simply
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In accordance with Resolution 808,' the U.N. Secretary-General, some
three months later, submitted his report on the potential tribunal! The report
cites the power of the Security Council pursuant to Chapter VII of the
United Nations Charter as the legal basis for the establishment of the Tribu-
nal.9 This measure provides the Council with the authority to take preventive
and enforcement measures in order to maintain international peace and secu-
rity. The report also addresses the issue of nullem crimen sine lege, indicat-
ing that the international tribunal should apply only those laws "which are
beyond any doubt part of customary law."'" On May 25, 1993, the Security
Council, through Resolution 827, adopted The Statute of the International
Tribunal ("Statute"), which it annexed to the report. " Article 20(1) of the
Statute dictates the manner in which individuals shall conduct proceedings
before the International Tribunal. "The Trial Chambers shall ensure that a
trial is fair and expeditious and that proceedings are conducted in accordance
with the rules of procedure and evidence, with full respect for the rights of
the accused and due regard for the protection of victims and witnesses.' '
The rules of procedure and evidence, referenced in Article 20(1), are not in-
cluded in the Statute. Rather, Article 15 of the Statute directs that the judges
of the Tribunal adopt these important regulations themselves." One critic
subsequently referred to this delegation of power to the judiciary as "dy-
namic yet troubling."'
does not exist." Ivan Simonovic, The Role of the ICTY in the Development of International
Criminal Adjudication, 23 FORDHAM INT'L L.J. 440, 454-55 (1999).
7. S.C. Res. 808, supra note 3, 1 2.
8. Report of the Secretary-General Pursuant to Paragraph 2 of Security Council Resolu-
tion 808 (1993), U.N. SCOR, U.N. Doc. S/25704, 2 (1993) [hereinafter Rep. of the Sec'y
Gen.].
9. Id. [ 18-30. The utilization of Chapter VII powers for this purpose was an issue of
concern for certain Member States. See Simonovic, supra note 6, at 445. It also required that a
link be established between the Tribunal and the restoration of peace in the former Yugosla-
via. See Goldstone, supra note 4, at 120 (observing that this connection distinguishes the fo-
cus of international criminal law from that "in the domestic arena").
10. Rep. of the Sec'y Gen., supra note 8, 34. This limitation also recognizes that the
Security Council has no law making powers. Goldstone, supra note 4, at 121. In spite of this,
the Tribunal has been subject to criticism; it has been suggested that the Statute actually cre-
ates new law. Tomuschat, supra note 4, at 242.
11. S.C. Res. 827, U.N. SCOR, 48th Sess., 3217th mtg. 1-2, U.N. Doc. S/RES/827
(1993).
12. Statute, supra note 1, art. 20(1).
13. The relevant article reads: "The judges of the International Tribunal shall adopt rules
of procedure and evidence for the conduct of the pre-trial phase of the proceedings, trials and
appeals, the admission of evidence, the protection of victims and witnesses and other appro-
priate matters." Id. art. 15.
14. Scott T. Johnson, On the Road to Disaster: The Rights of the Accused and the Inter-
national Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia, 10 INT'L LEGAL PERSP. 111, 166
(1998).
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III. THE DRAFTING OF THE RULES OF PROCEDURE AND
EVIDENCE FOR THE ICTY
Article 15 of the Statute creates a unique situation. It bestows upon the
judges of the ICTY the authority and responsibility to draft the rules of evi-
dence and procedure that are to apply from the pre-trial phase through to ap-
pellate matters. 5 Article 15 thus confers legislative powers upon the judici-
ary and requires the judges to draft the rules they will ultimately apply. This
union of the legislative and judicial powers of the Tribunal in one entity is a
merger that was, and continues to be, viewed as suspect by some.16
The initial task imposed upon the judges, that of designing a compre-
hensive set of international rules of procedure and evidence, was not easy
and essentially came without an appropriate precedent to follow." Interested
States and organizations provided assistance, however, in the form of sub-
missions made on their own behalf.8 These proposals varied in length and
depth. When the Tribunal finally adopted its Rules of Procedure and Evi-
dence (Rules) in February 1994, after "extensive debate and revision,"'9 the
15. Statute, supra note 1, art. 15.
16. See, e.g., Gideon Boas, Creating Laws of Evidence for International Criminal Law:
The ICTY and the Principle of Flexibility, 12 CRI. L.F. 41, 73 (2001) (noting that the union
of legislative and judicial functions opened the Tribunal to criticism) [hereinafter Boas, The
Principle of Flexibility]; Pavel Dolenc, A Slovenian Perspective on the Statute and Rules of
the International Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia, 5 CRIM. L.F. 451, 459 (1994); Andrd
Klip, The Decrease of Protection Under Human Rights Treaties in International Criminal
Law, 68 INT'L REV. PENAL L. 291, 302-03 (1997). Disapproval has also been expressed about
the fact that the rules and amendments made to them are not subject to review. See M. CHERIF
BASSIOUNI & PETER MANIKAS, THE LAW OF THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL TRIBUNAL FOR THE
FORMER YUGOSLAVIA 824, 827 (1996).
17. The Nuremberg Rules of Procedure contained merely eleven rules. International
Military Tribunal, Rules of Procedure, adopted Oct. 29, 1945, reprinted in MORRIS &
SCHARF, supra note 5, at 687. As a result, the precedential value of the same has been noted to
be "minimal." Daniel D. Ntanda Nsereko, Rules of Procedure and Evidence of the Interna-
tional Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia, 5 CRIM. L.F. 507, 508 (1994). The ICTY Rules
are believed to be "the first detailed set ... ever drafted for an international criminal tribunal."
Annual Report of the International Tribunal for the Prosecution of Persons Responsible for
Serious Violations of International Humanitarian Law Committed in the Territory of the
Former Yugoslavia Since 1991, U.N. SCOR, 49th Sess., Provisional Agenda Item 152, at 2,
U.N. Doc. A/49/342-S/199411007 (1994), available at http://www.un.org/icty/pub/htm [here-
inafter Ann. Rep.].
18. These were received pursuant to Security Council Resolution 827. S.C. Res. 827, su-
pra note 11, 3.
19. Ann. Rep., supra note 17, 1 55. Though early on substantial interest was shown in the
Tribunal's enumerated crimes and in its jurisdiction, its rules of procedure and evidence did
not attract comparable attention. Joseph L. Falvey, Jr., United Nations Justice or Military Jus-
tice: Which is the Oxymoron? An Analysis of the Rules of Procedure and Evidence of the In-
ternational Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia, 19 FORDHAM INT'L L.J. 475, 476-77 (1995).
Similarly, it has been noted that "[plrocedural rulings at the international level generally re-
ceive less attention than substantive ones." Affolder, supra note 6, at 448.
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comprehensive submissions received from the United States proved
"particularly influential."'
The structure of the Tribunal that ultimately emerged was thus akin to
the Anglo-American common law system.2 As such, the Tribunal does not
have an investigating judge, as found in inquisitorial systems.22 Rather, the
tasks of obtaining evidence and bringing indictments belong to the prosecu-
tor.23 Upon promulgation of the Rules, then President of the Tribunal, Anto-
nio Cassese, attributed the choice of a predominantly adversarial approach to
the limited precedent of the Nuremberg and Tokyo Trials and the need for
"us, as judges, to remain as impartial as possible."2 ' Thus, in their original
form, the adversarial mode of trial dominated the Tribunal's Rules.'
In drafting its Rules of Procedure and Evidence, the cloud of Nurem-
berg and Tokyo, recognized by members of the Security Council at the es-
tablishment of the Tribunal,26 became the albatross of its newly formed judi-
ciary. The judges inherited the duty of distinguishing the ICTY from its
predecessors and made an affirmative effort to accomplish the task. In his
first report to the United Nations General Assembly ("General Assembly")
and the Security Council, immediately after commenting on the rights be-
stowed upon the accused by the Tribunal and its full safe-guarding of the
same, President Cassese noted: "One can discern in the statute and the rules
20. MORRIS & SCHARF, supra note 5, at 177. The submission of approximately seventy-
five pages included commentary for guidance. Suggestions Made by the Government of the
United States of America, U.N. Doc. IT/14 (1993) reprinted in MORRIS & SCHARF, supra note
5, at 509.
21. CHRISTOPH J. M. SAFFERLING, TowARDS AN INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL PROCEDURE
223 (2001) (noting that the role of the prosecutor for the Tribunal greatly resembles its coun-
terpart in adversarial procedural systems). See also Richard May & Marieke Wierda, Evi-
dence Before the ICTY, in ESSAYS ON ICTY PROCEDURE AND EVIDENCE IN HONOUR OF
GABRIELLE KIRK McDONALD 249, 249 n.3 (Richard May et al. eds., 2001) (noting that each
party presents evidence by direct examination of its witnesses and that those witnesses are
then subject to cross-examination and re-examination).
22. Ann. Rep., supra note 17, 17 1.
23. Id.
24. Statement by the President Made at a Briefing to Members of Diplomatic Missions:
Summary of the Rules of Procedure of the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former
Yugoslavia, U.N. Doc. IT/29 (1994) [hereinafter Statement of the President], reprinted in
MORRIS & SCHARF, supra note 5, at 650. The President noted exceptions to the adversarial
construct in that the Tribunal would not be restricted by technical rules regarding the admissi-
bility of evidence and that the Tribunal may order the production of additional evidence pro-
prio motu. Id. at 650-51.
25. Patricia M. Wald, To "Establish Incredible Events by Credible Evidence": The Use
of Affidavit Testimony in Yugoslavia War Crimes Tribunal Proceedings, 42 HARV. INT'L L.J.
535, 537 (2001).
26. See Provisional Verbatim Record of the 3217th Meeting, U.N. SCOR, 48th Sess.,
3217th mtg. at 10-12, U.N. Doc. S/PV.3217 (1993) (quoting the French representative's dis-
tinction of the Tribunal from those at Nuremberg and Tokyo and the American representa-
tive's reiteration that "this will be no victors' tribunal").
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a conscious effort to avoid some of the often-mentioned flaws of Nurnberg
and Tokyo.""
IV. THE USE OF WRIrEN EVIDENCE AT THE POST WWII TRIBUNALS
While comparisons to Nuremberg and Tokyo would not necessarily
cause the ICTY to suffer from accusations of "victors' justice" per se, such
analogies would involve the allegations that contributed to the over-all dis-
paragement of the post-World War II trials. To properly understand the driv-
ing force behind the efforts to distinguish the ICTY from its antecedents, it is
instructive to examine some of the methods used by the Tribunals to perform
the. tasks assigned to them, along with appraisals of the same. Some have
criticized the proceedings that took place under the authority of these two
forerunners to the ICTY as- failing to provide necessary and complete due
process guarantees to individuals appearing before them.28 The source of dis-
approval may be due, in part, to the perceived excessive use and free admis-
sion of written testimony in their trial proceedings.29
At the outset of the Nuremberg proceedings, the prosecution intended to
put forth a completely paper trial; the prospect of calling witnesses was
merely a fallback position should the Tribunal reject its proffer of affidavit
testimony?0 Such a rejection was possible in light of the fact that the Nurem-
berg Charter, unlike the Charter for the Tokyo Tribunal,31 did not specifically
address the issue of affidavit admissibility.32 Arguing in favor of admission,
Chief Prosecutor Robert Jackson alluded to the negative ramifications that
exclusion would have upon the expediency of the proceedings, noting that
the Tribunal's acceptance of the sworn statements was indispensable "if we
27. Ann. Rep., supra note 17, 71.
28. See, e.g., RICHARD H. MINEAR, VICTORS' JUSTICE: THE TOKYO WAR CRIMES TRIAL
122-23 (1971). See also Michael P. Scharf, A Critique of the Yugoslavia War Crimes Tribu-
nal, 25 DENV. J. INT'L L. & POL'Y 305, 308-09 (1997).
29. Richard May & Marieke Wierda, Trends in International Criminal Evidence: Nur-
emberg, Tokyo, The Hague andArusha, 37 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 725, 751 (1999).
30. TELFORD TAYLOR, THE ANATOMY OF THE NUREMBERG TRIALS: A PERSONAL MEMOIR
243 (1992). This intention to proceed with documentary evidence alone was ultimately modi-
fied, a decision that no doubt saved the Tribunal from a severe academic backlash. See, e.g.,
SAFFERLING, supra note 21, at 277 (noting that the presence of a witness is necessary for a
thorough examination and that an attempt by the prosecution to interview witnesses prior to
trial and use the signed record of the same at trial is not sufficient).
31. See Tokyo Charter, supra note 5, art. 13(c)(3) (admission of affidavits specifically
sanctioned).
32. The Charter affirmatively notes, however, that the Tribunal should "not be bound by
technical rules of evidence." Charter of the International Military Tribunal, Aug. 8, 1945, art.
19, 59 Stat. 1544, 1551, 82 U.N.T.S. 279 [hereinafter London Charter], reprinted in MORRIS
& SCHARF, supra note 5, at 677, 682. It is also noteworthy that, under the Charter, the Tribu-
nal was required to take judicial notice of the "reports of the United Nations, including the
acts and documents of the committees set up in the various Allied countries for the investiga-
tion of war crimes .... Id. art. 21. These documents included the testimony taken by State
commissions regarding the Nazi atrocities. Wald, supra note 25, at 538.
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are to make any progress with this case."33 Although the Nuremberg Tribunal
chose not to provide a clear rule governing the admissibility of affidavits,3"
and its rulings regarding admission appear inconsistent,35 the ultimate role
that affidavit evidence played at Nuremberg was "extensive and very impor-
tant.
36
The pattern that eventually developed at Nuremberg was one wherein
the tribunal admitted affidavits, but admission was conditional on the right
of cross-examination or, alternatively, written interrogatories.37 The provi-
sion of the right of cross-examination was consistent with Jackson's pro-
posal to the Tribunal.3" However, it may not have pleased one of his princi-
ple aides, and ultimate successor, Telford Taylor. Taylor noted that, "it was
likely that defense lawyers might seek to draw statements from the witnesses
which would greatly weaken their direct testimony.""
The use of affidavit testimony at Nuremberg, even with this provision
for cross-examination or the use of written interrogatories, has been criti-
cized for its erosion of the right of the accused to a fair trial.' Additionally,
33. TAYLOR, supra note 30, at 242.
34. Id. at 243. The absence of rule clarity was a feature of the Tokyo proceedings as well.
See MINEAR, supra note 28, at 121 (noting that "[p]erhaps the most unsettling aspect of the
tribunal's procedure was its very uncertainness").
35. Witness availability initially appeared to be a factor in the Tribunal's decisions re-
garding affidavit testimony. The Tribunal accepted the affidavit of a former American Minis-
ter to Austria, apparently in light of his advanced age and distance from the Tribunal.
TAYLOR, supra note 30, at 241. An affidavit from the Austrian Prime Minister who was
"nearby and readily available for court testimony" was later refused. Id. Counsel for one of
the accused then requested the Tribunal to declare a general rule that individuals living in
Germany, and available for testimony, could not testify by affidavit. Id. The court declined to
comply with this request. Id. at 242. In a subsequent incident, an affidavit was admitted over
defense objections, in spite of the fact that the affiant was in custody at Nuremberg. Id. at
242-43. The Tribunal's attitude towards the admission of affidavit evidence has thus been re-
ferred to as ambivalent. May & Wierda, supra note 29, at 749.
36. See May & Wierda, supra note 29, at 749. "During the proceedings, the Nuremberg
Tribunal... received 300,000 ex parte affidavits into evidence." Scharf, supra note 28, at 309
(citing JOE J. HEYDECKER & JOHANNES LEEB, THE NUREMBERG TRIAL 94 (R.A. Downie,
trans., 1962)).
37. Wald, supra note 25, at 539. The opportunity to submit written interrogatories, for
example, was offered to the defense with regard to the admission of the affidavit of the former
American Minister to Austria. May & Wierda, supra note 29, at 750. It would seem, however,
that the use of written interrogatories does little to combat the charge that "ex parte affidavits
seriously undermine the right of the defendants to confront the witnesses against them."
Scharf, supra note 28, at 309.
38. The proposal also limited the use of affidavits to those "which were not directed
against any individual defendant." TAYLOR, supra note 30, at 241-42. Arguably, this right to
cross-examine was also consistent with the requirement in the London Charter that the
"[d]efense... may cross-examine any witnesses.., who give[] testimony." London Charter,
supra note 32, art. 24(g).
39. TAYLOR, supra note 30, at 241 (also noting that calling the witnesses would detract
from the expediency of the proceedings and might not allow for cross-examination by the
Prosecution).
40. Scharf, supra note 28, at 309 (averring that pro-prosecution rulings allowing for the
admission of affidavit testimony restricted the due process guarantees of defendants, particu-
2003]
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the value of such evidence was, and likely remains, a point of contention.
Circumventing the rule against leading questions," affidavit evidence is the
product of an environment wherein the court has no control over the process
in which lawyer and witness formulate the proposed testimony.42 At the To-
kyo Tribunal, the utility of affidavit testimony became doubtful to some,
and, as one judge noted, the interrogatory that formed the basis of an affida-
vit "increase[d] the range but decrease[d] the accuracy of the narration." '
Further, as was noted by Taylor: "Total reliance on... untested depositions
by unseen witnesses is certainly not the most reliable road to factual accu-
racy.... [N]ot only faulty observation but deliberate exaggeration must have
warped many of the reports." In light of the aforementioned, it is not sur-
prising that the use of ex parte affidavits "has in fact been a lightening [sic]
rod for criticism of the-Nuremberg Tribunal."'4
Consequently, and in compliance with the intent to circumvent those
blemishes that tarnish recollections of Nuremberg and Tokyo, the ICTY
Rules, as originally drafted, established a preference for live testimony.' The
ICTY made this choice despite the fact that the Tribunal must have recog-
nized, as did one observer in the early days of the ICTY, that "testimonial
evidence is the most expensive and time-consuming category of evidence."47
Although the controlling rule, sub-rule 90(A), did allow for exceptions to
live testimony in the form of depositions, the initial Rules limited the use of
the same to the discretion of the Trial Chamber and required a showing of
"exceptional circumstances."" In practice, the Tribunal's interpretation of
"exceptional circumstances" was rather narrow, and the use of depositions
was further limited to testimony deemed essential.49
larly with regard to instances where the affiants were available to testify). The proceedings at
Tokyo have likewise been subject to allegations of imbalanced rulings. See, e.g., MINEAR, SU-
pra note 28, at 122-23.
41. May & Wierda, supra note 29, at 751.
42. MINEAR, supra note 28, at 119.
43. May & Wierda, supra note 29, at 751 (quoting dissenting opinion of Justice Pal (July
25, 1946), reprinted in 2 THE TOKYO JUDGMENT: THE INTERNATIONAL MILITARY TRIBUNAL
FOR THE FAR EAST (IMTFE), 29 APRIL 1946-12 NOVEMBER 1948 636 (BV.A. Roling & C.F.
Ruter eds., 1977)).
44. TAYLOR, supra note 30, at 315.
45. Scharf, supra note 28, at 264.
46. The sub-rule provided: "Witnesses shall, in principle, be heard directly by the Cham-
bers unless a Chamber has ordered that the witness be heard by means of a deposition as pro-
vided for in Rule 71." ICTY RPE, supra note 2, R. 90(A).
47. Tomuschat, supra note 4, at 243.
48. ICTYRPE, supra note 2, R. 71(A).
49. Wald, supra note 25, at 545-46 (noting that the nonattendance of one or more judges
and the physical inability of a witness to appear at The Hague actively qualified as excep-
tional circumstances).
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V. THE TRIBUNAL'S ABILITY TO AMEND ITS RULES
The Rules of Procedure and Evidence formulated in February of 1994,
however, were by no means considered to be final or complete. Thus, within
the Rules, the judges designed a mechanism for subsequent amendments in
the form of Rule 6.5 The first subsection of the rule, as originally adopted,
allowed for amendment proposals to be made by a Judge, the Prosecutor or
the Registrar and provided that the proposals would be adopted if agreed to
by at least seven Judges at a plenary meeting."
A review of the annual reports of the Tribunal since its inception is il-
luminating with regard to this continuing "legislative power."52 In the early
stages, an Inter-sessional Working Group for the Amendment of Rules,
composed of five judges, was established to consider the comments of gov-
ernments, non-governmental organizations and individuals; the Working
Group submitted its report to the fifth plenary session in January 1995." The
report resulted in 41 amendments54 and paved the way for the many amend-
ments to come in the plenary sessions that followed.5 The judiciary contin-
ued to develop the methods used in the exercise of its legislative powers,
utilizing the Judicial Department, which assists with advice and suggestions
for amendments, as a "channel of communication between the Tribunal and
50. See ICTY RPE, supra note 2, at R. 6.
51. Id. at R. 6(A). All judges must be given notice of the proposals. Id. There were
eleven judges at the time of original adoption. Ann. Rep., supra note 17, $ 1. There are pres-
ently sixteen permanent judges. Ninth Annual Report of the International Tribunal for the
Prosecution of Persons Responsible for Serious Violations of International Humanitarian
Law Committed in the Territory of the Former Yugoslavia Since 1991, U.N. GAOR, 57th
Sess., Provisional Agenda Item 45, 1, U.N. Doc. A/57/379-S/2002/985 (2002) [hereinafter
Ninth Ann. Rep.]. Due to this increase in the number of judges, the assent of ten judges is now
required for a proposed amendment to be adopted. See ICTY RPE revision 28, supra note 2, at
R. 6(A).
52. Louise Arbour, The Status of the International Criminal Tribunals for the Former
Yugoslavia and Rwanda: Goals and Results, 3 HOFSTRA L. & PoL'Y SYMP. 37, 45 (1999). See
also Third Annual Report of the International Tribunal for the Prosecution of Persons Re-
sponsible for Serious Violations of International Humanitarian Law Committed in the Terri-
tory of the Former Yugoslavia Since 1991, U.N. GAOR, 51st Sess., Provisional Agenda Item
50, 3, U.N. Doc. A/51/292-S/19961665 (1996) [hereinafter Third Ann. Rep.] (noting the
"Judges of the Tribunal are obliged by the Statute to 'legislate' on procedural matters.").
53. Second Annual Report of the International Tribunal for the Prosecution of Persons
Responsible for Serious Violations of International Humanitarian Law Committed in the Ter-
ritory of the Former Yugoslavia Since 1991, U.N. GAOR, 50th Sess., Provisional Agenda
Item 49, $ 20, U.N. Doc. A/50/365-S/1995728 (1995).
54. Id. The Tribunal cited five goals for amendments. See id. 21. Among them were to
take into account practical problems that have arisen in implementation of the Statute or the
Rules, to broaden the rights of suspects and accused persons and to protect the rights of vic-
tims and witnesses. Id. $ 21, 24, 26.
55. Although fewer amendments were noted the following year, this is an anomaly
among the Tribunal's annual reports and is arguably tempered by the fact that some amend-
ments resulted in "'significant changes." ThirdAnn. Rep., supra note 52, 66.
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the States."'56 In December 1997, the Tribunal established a new working
group, the Rules Committee, with the cited purpose of expediting the trial
process while keeping in tact the rights of the accused."
The Tribunal has not been shy about utilizing its ability to revise its
Rules of Procedure and Evidence.58 Rather, it has used this authority exten-
sively.59 In the realm of amendments to the Rules, the Tribunal has actively
availed itself of this "quasi-legislative"' process. According to the Tribunal,
its ability to make amendments has enabled it to react to new and emerging
issues experienced by it, in a manner that is consistent with the requirement
that its proceedings be fair and expeditious and provide due regard for vic-
tims and witnesses." Thus, the amendment process can serve as a reactive
tool, providing a mechanism for the judiciary to make necessary changes in
response to issues and circumstances that it may not have anticipated. In-
deed, according to Judge Richard May, "the amendments reflect the experi-
ence gained by the Tribunal."'6 However, it would likely be erroneous to as-
cribe to the position that this is the sole impetus, or even the primary
motivating factor, for amendments made to the Tribunal's Rules of Proce-
dure and Evidence.
56. Id. 103.
57. Fifth Annual Report of the International Tribunal for the Prosecution of Persons Re-
sponsible for Serious Violations of International Humanitarian Law Committed in the Terri-
tory of the Former Yugoslavia Since 1991, U.N. GAOR, 53rd Sess., Agenda Item 48, 106,
U.N. Doc. A153/219-S/1998f737 (1998).
58. In fact, "the ICTY has pursued a level of flexibility in the process of creating, amend-
ing and interpreting its Rules with a frequency unknown to any other jurisdiction before it."
Boas, The Principle of Flexibility, supra note 16, at 42. The Tribunal's use of its amendment
ability has been referred to as prolific. Gideon Boas, Developments in the Law of Procedure
and Evidence at the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia and the In-
ternational Criminal Court, 12 CRIM. L.F. 167, 169 (2001) [hereinafter Boas, Developments].
59. According to one source, "[olne definitely needs a loose-leaf version of the Rules of
Procedure and Evidence." Dirk Ryneveld, Q.C. & Daryl A. Mundis, The Contribution of the
ICTY to the Emergence of the ICC: Procedural and Evidentiary Aspects from a Practitioner's
Perspective, in THE INTERNATIONAL CENTRE FOR CRIMINAL LAW REFORM AND CRIMINAL
JUSTICE POLICY, THE CHANGING FACE OF INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL LAW: SELECTED PAPERS
51, 61 (2002).
60. Ann. Rep., supra note 17, 27; BASSIOUNI & MANIKAS, supra note 16, at 270.
61. Sixth Annual Report of the International Tribunal for the Prosecution of Persons Re-
sponsible for Serious Violations of International Humanitarian Law Committed in the Terri-
tory of the Former Yugoslavia Since 1991, U.N. GAOR, 54th Sess., Provisional Agenda Item
53, 107, U.N. Doc. A/54/187-S/1999/846 (1999) [hereinafter Sixth Ann. Rep.] (noting, "[als
the Tribunal conducts more trials and begins hearing substantive appeals it will be necessary
to review and, where appropriate, amend the Rules in order to ensure the proper administra-
tion of justice under the Tribunal's mandate").
62. May & Wierda, supra note 29, at 735.
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VI. THREATS TO THE INDEPENDENCE OF THE TRIBUNAL
While "the Tribunal [is] required to perform its functions independently
of political considerations and the control of the Security Council,"'63 whether
the Tribunal can realistically act in such a manner remains to be seen. As an
elementary matter, this presupposes independence on the part of the judici-
ary, all of whose members the General Assembly elects from a list of candi-
dates supplied by the President of the Security Council. ' Further, the Tribu-
nal is completely dependent upon the General Assembly for its funding.' Of
potentially greater importance, in order for the Tribunal to function on even
a basic level, it must rely upon support both from States and from the Secu-
rity Council.'
The effect of States upon the Tribunal may not appear as obvious, at
first blush, as that of the U.N. organs. However, States play a vital role in the
Tribunal's ability to carry out its mandate. There is likely no better example
of this than the experience of the ICTY's sister tribunal, the International
Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda6 ("ICTR") in the Barayagwiza case.68 In that
matter, the Appeals Chamber found a number of the rights of the accused
violated, including his right to be promptly charged and his right to an initial
appearance without undue delay. Based upon the facts of the case, the Ap-
peals Chamber invoked the abuse of process doctrine"0 and dismissed the
charges against the accused with prejudice." In response, the outraged
Rwandan government virtually brought the ICTR's activities to a standstill,
refusing to allow witnesses to travel to its proceedings and denying visa
privileges to the chief prosecutor of the ICTR." The stalemate persisted until
Chief Prosecutor, Carla Del Ponte, asked the Court to reconsider its ruling,
63. Simonovic, supra note 6, at 443.
64. Statute, supra note 1, art. 13(2). Judges are also eligible for re-election. Id. art. 13(4).
This "eligibility for reelection... could mitigate against the principle of judicial independ-
ence." BASSIOUNI & MANIKAS, supra note 16, at 806.
65. Statute, supra note 1, art. 32.
66. HENRY J. STEuRNER & PHILIP ALSTON, INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS IN CONTEXT:
LAW, POLITICS, MORALS 1155-56 (2000). Accordingly, it has been observed that the Tribunal
"remains dependent on an uncertain and changing political context" and that it "lacks the rela-
tive autonomy of a court in a state with a strong tradition of an independent judiciary." Id. at
1155.
67. Established under the Statute of the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda, 33
I.L.M. 1598, 1602, adopted by S.C. Res. 955, U.N. SCOR, 49th Sess., 3453rd mtg. at 3, U.N.
Doc. S/RES/955 (1994).
68. See The Prosecutor v. Barayagwiza, Case No. ICTR-97-19-AR72 (Nov. 3, 1999)
(decision in the Appeals Chamber) [hereinafter Barayagwiza Decision]. See also William A.
Schabas, International Decision: Barayagwiza v. Prosecutor, 94 AM. J. INT'L L. 563 (2000).
69. Barayagwiza Decision, supra note 68, 100.
70. Id. 1101.
71. Id. 108.
72. See Jacob Katz Cogan, International Criminal Courts and Fair Trials: Difficulties
and Prospects, 27 YALE J. INT'L L. 111, 135 (2002).
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submitting a motion that cited new facts. 3 Appearing as amicus curiae be-
fore the Tribunal, the Rwandan Attorney General "openly threatened the non
co-operation of the peoples of Rwanda with the Tribunal if faced with an un-
favourable Decision by the Appeals Chamber on the Motion for Review." '7
He was not disappointed. Although the Court's reversal stated that the origi-
nal decision was based on incorrect facts, "[t]his did not assuage fears that
political pressure was the real cause of the change.""
It would be even more difficult to deny the effect of political pressure
on the Tribunals in light of the recent controversy regarding Carla Del Ponte,
who, like her two predecessors, has jointly served as Chief Prosecutor of
both the ICTY and the ICTR.6 Del Ponte "publicly turned a page in the
ICTR's history by announcing.., that her team had been investigating
crimes committed by soldiers belonging to the Rwandan Patriotic Front.""
In the aftermath of this announcement, the Rwandan government imposed
travel restrictions upon witnesses for the ICTR trials "as a way of bringing
pressure on the ICTR."78 As a next step, it was noted that the Rwandan gov-
ernment was campaigning for Del Ponte's removal from the position.79 It
was further reported that this campaign was intensified due to the fact that
four active Rwandan army officers, including a general, were about to be the
focus of indictments.80 Approximately one month after the Rwandan gov-
ernment's "heightened campaign" against Del Ponte, the Security Council
73. Barayagwiza v. The Prosecutor, Case No. ICTR-97-19-AR72, 39 I.L.M. 1181 (Mar.
31, 2000) (decision in the Appeals Chamber on Prosecutor's request for review or reconsid-
eration) [hereinafter Decision on Request for Review]. See also Cogan, supra note 72, at 135.
74. Decision on Request for Review, supra note 73, 34.
75. Sylvia de Bertodano, U.S. in the Dock over International Justice, TIMES (London),
Jan. 7, 2003, at 8. It is perhaps not surprising that a former chief prosecutor has cited the need
to diminish the Tribunal's dependency on States. See Arbour, supra note 52, at 39. Arguably
representative of the perpetual sphere of influence over the Tribunal, however, Arbour cites
the need for the Security Council to enhance State cooperation. See id. at 43.
76. See Statute of the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda, supra note 67, art.
15(3) (mandating that the Prosecutor for the ICTY also serve as Prosecutor for the ICTR).
77. Carla Del Ponte Replaced as ICTR Prosecutor, AFR. NEws, Aug. 29, 2003.
78. Id. (noting that, as a result, the ICTR was forced to suspend some of its trials). See
also Jim Lobe, Groups Urge U.N. to Ensure Impartiality of Rwanda Tribunal, INTER-PRESS
SERVICE, Aug. 12, 2003 (remarking that Del Ponte "has long been a thorn in the side" of the
government, which has actively resisted investigation of its soldiers, and that the government
imposed travel restrictions on trial witnesses to exert pressure in an attempt to stop one such
investigation).
79. Marlise Simons, Rwanda Is Said to Seek New Prosecutor for War Crimes Court,
N.Y. TIMEs, July 28, 2003, at A2 (citing statements from "Western diplomats and tribunal
officials" that the campaign for removal was in response to Del Ponte's investigation of senior
civilian and military members of the present government for their involvement in the atroci-
ties that took place in Rwanda).
80. Steven Edwards, U.N. Prosecutor Fights for Job, LEADER-POST (Regina, Canada)
Aug. 9, 2003, at A4 (noting that Del Ponte appealed to the Security Council to allow her to
keep the post, alleging she was a victim of the Rwandan government's campaign and that
Secretary General Kofi Annan was "said to be under intense pressure from African leaders to
make way for an African to head the prosecution office in the Rwandan court").
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passed a resolution separating the two prosecutorial posts."' Although the
Secretary-General has maintained that the severance of the two posts seemed
to him "essential, in the interests of efficiency and effectiveness,"82 this ar-
gument is hardly a persuasive one. In addition, it contrasts starkly with the
representations of Del Ponte, who earlier averred that a decision not to renew
her mandate would make it harder for the Tribunal to function effectively83
and ultimately maintained that the severance of the two prosecutorial posi-
tions was politically motivated."
In light of the forgoing, it is difficult to maintain that outside wishes and
interests, be they attributed to the form of a U.N. organ, an individual State,
or even the international community at large, fail to influence the activities
of the Tribunal. 5 Just as an argument exists that such entities are capable of
wielding their power in the realm of judicial decision-making, it can also be
asserted that the amendment powers of the Tribunal are likewise susceptible
to such activity. The fact that the Tribunal may be pressured to modify its
procedure in response to outside pressure becomes particularly relevant with
regard to the length of time involved in the Tribunal's efforts to fulfill its
function.
VII. THE PRESSURE TO EXPEDITE PROCEEDINGS AT THE ICTY
A. External Influences
It is perhaps trite to note that proceedings at the ICTY have not ad-
vanced quickly and that the Tribunal has been the subject of criticism for
failing to move its docket expeditiously. 6 Consequently, "external" voices
have made, and are continuing to make, themselves heard with regard to the
length of proceedings before the ICTY. Along these lines, the General As-
sembly, in its adoption of a resolution on the financing of the Tribunal, re-
quested that the Secretary-General evaluate the efficiency of the operation
and function of the ICTY.8 The resultant 1999 report suggested procedural
81. See, e.g., U.N. War Crimes Prosecutor Stresses Independence After Losing Rwanda
Job, AGENCE FR. PRESSE, Aug. 29, 2003 [hereinafter Rwanda Job].
82. Annan Recommends Change of Rwanda Tribunal Prosecutor, U.N. WIRE, July 29,
2003, at http://www.unwire.org/UNWire/20030729/449_7028.asp (noting that if each tribunal
had its own prosecutor, the tribunals would benefit from having an individual who would be
able to give his or her undivided attention).
83. AFP Europe News Summary, AGENCE FRANCE PRESSE, Aug. 9,2003.
84. Rwanda Job, supra note 81.
85. Both "[t]he ICTY and ICTR 'have been troubled by their dependence on funding and
political pressures."' Bruce Zagaris, U.S. Congress Has Oversight Hearing on International
War Crimes Tribunals, INT'L ENFORCEMENT L. REP., Apr. 2002, art. XI.
86. See, e.g., Wald, supra note 25, at 536.
87. The ICTR was subject to review as well. Seventh Annual Report of the International
Tribunal for the Prosecution of Persons Responsible for Serious Violations of International
Humanitarian Law Committed in the Territory of the Former Yugoslavia Since 1991, U.N.
GAOR, 55th Sess., Provisional Agenda Item 52, 320, U.N. Doc. A155/273-S/20001777
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modifications with the intent of expediting the trial process.8 The Tribunal
itself has acknowledged the effect of outside entities on its practice, even
beyond its response to the aforementioned report. 9 In its own report, issued
in 2000, the Tribunal noted as its goal the development of "flexible solu-
tions" to enable the judges to work with their increased caseloads, and "with
the expectations of the accused, the victims and the international commu-
nity." Subsequently, in the course of trial proceedings, Judge May noted
that: "It is a matter of concern to the international community that these tri-
als have been taking up six months and more each."'
The issue of the international community and its effect on the workings
of the Tribunal is thus one of significance. The term "international commu-
nity" is somewhat of an amorphous concept; arguably, it would include, but
not be limited to, the body of the General Assembly. There is also "the court
of public opinion" whose interests, in part, may be found in, and shaped by,
the media. This could give one reason to pause with regard to the effect the
group potentially has over the Tribunal's practice. In the aftermath of the
first case adjudicated before the ICTY, "[t]he fair trial process did not make
headlines." In addition, authors have criticized both the ICTY and the
ICTR for a "relative lack of production, in terms of indictments and convic-
tions, since their inception."93 Consequently, it is perhaps fitting that media
coverage of the ICTY proceedings has been alleged to reveal a prosecutorial
bias and that, generally speaking, "to be indicted by a UN tribunal is to be
(2000) [hereinafter Seventh Ann. Rep.]. The expert group appointed to this task was specifi-
cally asked to explain why, after six years and budgets totaling over $400 million, only 15
ICTY and ICTR trials had been completed. See Hafida Lahiouel, The Right of the Accused to
an Expeditious Trial, in ESSAYS ON ICTY PROCEDURE AND EVIDENCE IN HONOUR OF
GABRIELLE KIRK MCDONALD 197, 197 n.3 (Richard May et al. eds., 2001) (citing Report of
the Expert Group to Conduct a Review of the Effective Operation and Functioning of the In-
ternational Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia (ICTY) and the International Criminal Tribu-
nal for Rwanda (ICTR), U.N. GAOR, 54th Sess., 35, U.N. Doc. A/54/634 (1999) [hereinaf-
ter Report of the Expert Group]).
88. Wald, supra note 25, at 536.
89. "Nearly all the recommendations contained in the Expert Group report were applied
or are about to be implemented with the exception of the recommendations involving
amendments to the Statute of the Tribunal." Seventh Ann. Rep., supra note 87, at Summary.
90. Id. 330 (emphasis added).
91. Trial Transcript at 2441, Prosecutor v. Sikirica, ICTY Case No. IT-95-8-T (Apr. 24,
2001).
92. Elise Groulx, Presentation on the Rights of the Accused Before the ICTY 3 (paper
presented at the International Conference on War Crime Trials, Humanitarian Law Center,
Nov. 7-8, 1998, Belgrade, Yugoslavia) at http://www.hri.ca/partners/aiad-icdaa/reports/ bel-
grade.htm.
93. George S. Yacoubian, Jr., Evaluating the Efficacy of the International Criminal Tri-
bunals for Rwanda and the Former Yugoslavia: Implications for Criminology and Interna-
tional Criminal Law, 165 WORLD AFF. 133 (2003) (emphasis added), available at
http://www.findarticles.com/cf_0/m2393/3_165/97484236/print.jhtml. See also Peter Mack-
ler, U.N. Court Under Attack at Delicate Moment, AGENCE FRANCE PRESS, Mar. 1, 2002 (not-
ing that, "[oithers complain justice has not been all that swift; the court here has handed down
only I final convictions in nine years...").
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guilty."94 This perceived alignment with the prosecution is not limited to the
media, however. Individuals and entities that championed the Tribunals'
creation also seem to share this affinity, and these forces are ones that here-
tofore advocated for the rights of the accused.95 The influence of the interna-
tional community over the practice of the Tribunal is, therefore, not only im-
portant with regard to its noted preference for more expeditious proceedings,
but also for its potential indifference to the fair trial rights of the accused.
B. The Right of the Accused to an Expeditious Trial and to be
Tried Without Undue Delay
In fairness, one cannot disregard the fact that among those rights be-
stowed upon the accused is that of a speedy trial, a right that is enshrined in
both major international and regional instruments.96 Accordingly, pursuant to
the ICTY Statute, its proceedings must not only be fair but expeditious.9
That such a requirement inures to the benefit of the accused is obvious; a
speedy trial enhances the ability of an accused to put forth an effective de-
fense and limits the amount of time in which he remains uncertain as to his
fate. 8 The right can have significant importance, particularly in light of the
fact that those indicted by the Tribunal were initially subject to a presump-
tion against pre-trial release and in favor of detention." Though the Tribunal
has since modified this preference," the change has been met with an at-
94. Henri Astier, Rights of the Despised, 11 THE AM. PROSPECT, Aug. 14, 2000, avail-
able at http://www.prospect.org/print/Vl 1/18/astier-h.html.
95. "[B]ecause NGOs have led the good fight against impunity for dictators, the war
crimes tribunals are in many ways their offspring." Id. See also Cogan, supra note 72, at 112
(noting, in the international context, that those from the "political left," who have historically
been sensitive to fair trial rights, have favored the prosecutor in their endeavor for an effective
court).
96. See, e.g., African Charter on Human and Peoples' Rights, adopted June 27, 1981, art.
7(l)(d), O.A.U. Doc. CAB/LEG/67/3/Rev. 5, reprinted in 21 I.L.M. 58; American Conven-
tion on Human Rights: "Pact of San Jose, Costa Rica," Nov. 22, 1969, art. 8(1), 1144
U.N.T.S. 144, 147; International Covenant of Civil and Political Rights, adopted Dec. 16,
1966 art. 14(3)(c), 999 U.N.T.S. 171, 174 [hereinafter ICCPR]; European Convention for the
Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, Nov. 4, 1950, art. 6(1), 213
U.N.T.S. 221.
97. Statute, supra note 1, art. 20(1).
98. Lahiouel, supra note 87, at 198.
99. ICTY RPE, supra note 2, at R. 65(B) (declaring that release may be ordered only in
exceptional circumstances). This provision is contrary to the principle espoused in the ICCPR
which provides that, "[ilt shall not be the general rule that persons awaiting trial shall be de-
tained in custody ... " ICCPR, supra note 96, art. 9(3). The provision of pre-trial release is
considered "an accoutrement of the presumption of innocence." Patricia Wald & Jenny Mar-
tinez, Provisional Release and the ICTY: A Work in Progress, in ESSAYS ON ICTY
PROCEDURE AND EVIDENCE IN HONOUR OF GABRIELLE KIRK MCDONALD 231, 231 (Richard
May et al. eds., 2001).
100. Wald & Martinez, supra note 99, at 233-34 (noting the removal of the requirement
of "exceptional circumstances" in response to the 1999 Report of the Expert Group). The ef-
fect of the amendment is uncertain. Id. at 234.
2003]
62 CALIFORNIA WESTERN INTERNATIONAL LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 34
tempt on behalf of the prosecution to make provisional release more difficult
to obtain.'
Accordingly, efforts to expedite the proceedings at the Tribunal do have
the potential to enhance the status of the accused. To complete the picture,
however, it is important to recognize that the right to a speedy trial is in-
tended to accomplish more than the protection of the interests of the ac-
cused. Verdicts rendered long after the date of the charged offense tend to
cause the confidence of the public in its justice system to deteriorate; thus,
inherently, the right is also meant to enhance the credibility of the relevant
system of criminal justice."° As a result, the interests of the Tribunal, vis-, -
vis the manner in which outsiders perceive it, actually lie within this right of
the accused. Arguably, the relevant perception of the Tribunal involves not
only the level of confidence maintained in it by the residents of the former
Yugoslavia, but the sentiment adopted by the international community re-
garding the Tribunal as well. It is therefore logical that the Tribunal's "need
to expedite trials is not a motivation born only out of the right of an accused
person to a fair and expeditious trial, but also of the political pressures under
which the International Tribunal operates."' 3
C. Addressing the Causes of the Delay
Turning to the issue of the prolonged activities of the ICTY itself, it is
important to note that one cannot attribute the delays incurred by the Tribu-
nal to a single source. The Tribunal has experienced numerous hurdles in its
efforts to obtain evidence and to secure those it has charged, including "po-
litically inspired delays in the arrest of indicted war criminals."'" Once the
accused is before the Tribunal, a new series of difficulties emerge. Proceed-
ings become protracted due to such issues as language difficulties 5 and the
101. While one of the judges of the Tribunal recently noted the success of some applica-
tions for release, he also pointed to a consequent attempt on behalf of the Prosecution to
"stem the tide" of successful applications. See Prosecutor v. Sainovic, ICTY Case No. IT-99-
37-AR65, 1 (Oct. 30, 2002) (dissenting opinion of Judge David Hunt in the Appeals Cham-
ber on provisional release).
102. Lahiouel, supra note 87, at 198 (noting the importance of this interest in light of the
fact that part of the "Tribunal's mandate includes bringing peace in the territory of the former
Yugoslavia"). It has also been asserted that a delay in justice is grossly unfair to victims.
Goldstone, supra note 4, at 123-24.
103. Boas, Developments, supra note 58, at 167.
104. Goldstone, supra note 4, at 124 (noting that such delays have the potential to seri-
ously undermine the credibility of the ICTY and ICTR). The difficulty in securing custody of
those indicted is also the result of the limited number of voluntary surrenders, a fact that pur-
portedly may be attributed to the tendency for pre-trial detention at the ICTY to be protracted.
See Arbour, supra note 52, at 41.
105. ANTONIO CASSESE, INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL LAw 443 (2003). The ICTY has two
working languages, English and French. Statute, supra note 1, art. 33. The Conference and
Language Services Section at the ICTY provides simultaneous interpretation not only from
and into English and French, but also from and into Bosnian/Croatian/Serbian. Third Ann.
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required proof of "predicate conditions" to establish the crimes over which
the Tribunal has jurisdiction, such as a showing of a widespread or system-
atic practice to prove the charge of crimes against humanity.'" In addition,
virtually all cases go to trial; contrary to the experience and practice in most
common law jurisdictions, guilty pleas are the exception to the rule."c How-
ever, according to Cassese, the length of international criminal proceedings
"results primarily from the adoption of the adversarial system, which re-
quires that all the evidence be scrutinized orally through examination and
cross-examination." ' Live testimony is, of course, part and parcel of this
process. "[T]he most time consuming aspect of any criminal trial," it has
proven to be "particularly so in the ICTY jurisdiction."'"
VIII. RULE CHANGES MADE TO EXPEDITE PROCEEDINGS
As a result, it is not surprising that the Tribunal has responded to the
pressure to expedite its proceedings at the expense of live testimony. Of
course, such changes run the risk of exposing the Tribunal to the criticisms
that plague the memories of Nuremberg and Tokyo and, additionally, cen-
sure with regard to the Tribunal's inconsistent commitment to the principles
espoused by it in favor of live testimony. The original Rules, with their
stated preference for such evidence pursuant to sub-rule 90(A), only pro-
vided for a positive exception in the case of depositions and further limited
the use of the same to "exceptional circumstances.""' It is particularly note-
worthy that, shortly after the adoption of the first version of its Rules, the
Tribunal remarked that "in order to protect 'equality of arms' (and, in par-
ticular, the rights of the accused), the procedure for taking depositions al-
lows for the cross-examination of the witness.'"" The Tribunal, however,
Rep., supra note 52, 134. "In addition, simultaneous interpretation of other languages is
provided as required." Id.
106. Wald, supra note 25, at 536. "Much of the problem lies in the nature of the beast.
The scope of most war crimes tends to cover wide swaths of territory and implicate hundreds,
sometimes thousands of actors." Id. at 554. "[H]ow can trials of such potentially endless
complexity be reduced to manageable proportions for a criminal court? No issue taxes the
Tribunals as. this one does." Daryl A. Mundis, Improving the Operation and Functioning of
the International Criminal Tribunals, 94 AM. J. INT'L L. 759, 773 (2000) (quoting Comments
on the Report of the Expert Group to Conduct a Review of the Effective Operation and Func-
tioning of the International Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia and the International Crimi-
nal Tribunal for Rwanda, U.N. Doc. A/54/850).
107. See CASSESE, supra note 105, at 398 (observing that very few defendants have pled
guilty before the ICTY). See also Wald, supra note 25, at 549 (noting that, although contro-
versial, a prosecutorial policy of encouraging guilty pleas by dropping some charges and rec-
ommending lesser sentences "could help clean up the backlog of less heinous cases").
108. CASSESE, supra note 105, at 442 (noting that, conversely, in the inquisitorial system,
the investigating judge selects the evidence prior to trial).
109. Boas, Developments, supra note 58, at 178.
110. ICTYRPE, supra note 2, at R. 71(A).
111. Ann. Rep., supra note 17, 79 (emphasis added). This right "did not itself provide
any right for the defendant to be present at all depositions." Wald, supra note 25, at 546.
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made this statement before the commencement of its first case and, accord-
ingly, before it began to experience the push to accelerate its proceedings.
The Tribunal first acknowledged the need to expedite its proceedings in
1996, noting that "procedures for expeditious decision-making by the Tribu-
nal would be developed and would take effect immediately" pursuant to the
Dayton Accord.'2 From that point on, the Tribunal would continue to make
changes to its procedures for the purpose of expedition; along these lines,
Rule 94 ter was introduced in 1998."' The rule provided that a party may
move to introduce affidavit evidence, for corroborative purposes, to "prove a
fact in dispute," and, unlike the rule governing depositions, Rule 94 ter did
not confer an automatic right of cross-examination upon the non-moving
party. 1, In spite of the introduction of this Rule, the Tribunal continued to
call attention to its reliance upon live testimony, highlighting the benefits of
the same and distinguishing its procedure from that of Nuremberg and To-
kyo.'1
5
In early 2000, however, the Tribunal's preference for live testimony be-
gan to erode further still. The Tribunal amended its rule governing deposi-
tion testimony (Rule 71), omitting the requirement that a Trial Chamber
must find "exceptional circumstances" before it can order that deposition
112. Third Ann. Rep., supra note 52, 80.
113. See, e.g., Sixth Ann. Rep., supra note 61, 1 116.
The purpose behind Rule 94 ter was the desire to contribute to the expedition of
cases before the International Tribunal, by providing a mechanism whereby affi-
davit evidence could be brought before a Trial Chamber in certain circumstances,
avoiding the need to call every witness relied upon in relation to a fact in dispute
especially when the testimony is cumulative.
Prosecutor v. Kordic, ICTY Case No. IT-95-14/2-AR73.6, 25 (Sept. 18, 2000) (decision in
the Appeals Chamber regarding the admission into evidence of seven affidavits and one for-
mal statement) [hereinafter Kordic Seven Affidavits Decision].
114. The Rule, in its final version, provided:
To prove a fact in dispute, a party may propose to call a witness and to submit in
corroboration of his or her testimony on that fact affidavits or formal statements
signed by other witnesses in accordance with the law and procedure of the State in
which such affidavits are signed. These affidavits or statements are admissible
provided they are filed prior to the giving of the testimony by the witness to be
called and the other party does not object within seven days after completion of the
testimony of the witness through whom the affidavits are tendered. If the party ob-
jects and the Trial Chamber so rules, or if the Trial Chamber so orders, the wit-
nesses shall be called for cross-examination.
ICTY Rules of Procedure and Evidence, revision 17, Rule 94 ter, U.N. Doc. IT/32/Rev.17
(1999) (deleted Dec. 2000) [hereinafter ICTY RPE revision 17]. This provision for the admis-
sion of affidavit testimony was one of several "trial management tools" created to reduce the
length of trials. See, e.g., Sixth Ann. Rep., supra note 61, 14.
115. "[U]nlike the Nuremberg and Tokyo trials, a great deal of reliance is placed on the
testimony of witnesses rather than on affidavits, and the Tribunal is committed to ensuring
that the rights of the accused are fully respected in accordance with contemporary human
rights norms." Sixth Ann. Rep., supra note 61, 13.
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testimony be taken for use at trial."6 The Tribunal made the amendment just
four months after the Appeals Chamber strictly upheld the rule's "excep-
tional circumstances" requirement, holding that the unavailability of one of
the presiding judges on a case failed to meet the requisite threshold for a
finding of such circumstances. ' The amendment, however, received no
more than a casual mention in the Tribunal's Seventh Annual Report
(2000)."' In the year following this change, the use of written testimony at
the Tribunal served as the subject of numerous interlocutory appeals on be-
half of the accused.
IX. WRITTEN TESTIMONY IN THE CASE OF PROSECUTOR V. KoRDIC
A. The Statement of Deceased Witness, Haskic, Offered
Pursuant to Rule 89(C)
In February 2000, in the case of Prosecutor v. Kordic, the Prosecution
successfully admitted into evidence an unsworn statement, taken by one of
its investigators and made by witness Midhat Haskic."9 Haskic had died be-
fore the Prosecution offered the statement at trial. 2' Haskic's statement al-
leged that the accused, Kordic, was seen in a certain village on the day prior
to its being attacked; it further claimed that Kordic was seen there in the
company of a particularly notorious unit of the Croatian Defense Council,
the group implicated in the raid.' The Prosecution argued that "in the case
of a deceased witness, the complete unavailability of his or her live evidence
justifies an exception to the principle of direct testimony enshrined in Rule
90. ' Over the objections of the defense, which had succeeded in excluding
116. Wald, supra note 25, at 545-46 (noting that no substitute conditions were placed in
its stead and that, even with the "exceptional circumstances" requirement, the ICTY rule gov-
erning deposition testimony represented a deviation from due process standards established in
the United States).
117. See Prosecutor v. Kupreskic, Case No. IT-95-16, 21 (July 15, 1999) (decision on
appeal by Dragan Papic against ruling to proceed by deposition). Rule 15 bis (A) now enables
a Chamber to continue proceedings with only two judges, for a period of up to five days if the
absence of the third judge is due to illness, urgent personal reasons or for reasons of author-
ized Tribunal business. See ICTYRPE revision 28, supra note 2, at R. 15 bis.
118. Seventh Ann. Rep., supra note 87, 294 (stating that change would provide more
easily for the taking of deposition evidence).
119. Prosecutor v. Kordic, ICTY Case No. IT-95-14/2-AR73.5, 5 (July 21, 2000) (de-
cision in the Appeals Chamber regarding statement of a deceased witness) [hereinafter Kordic
Deceased Witness Decision].
120. Id.
121. Id.
122. Prosecutor's Response to Accused Dario Kordic's Application for Leave to Pursue
an Interlocutory Appeal of a February 21, 2000 Ruling of the Trial Chamber to Admit into
Evidence a Prior Unsworn, Uncorroborated Witness Statement Whose Maker Mr. Kordic
Could Neither Confront Nor Cross-Examine at 3, ICTY Case No. IT-95-14/2 (Mar. 9, 2000)
(on file with author).
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the statement at an earlier time in the proceedings,' the Trial Chamber ad-
mitted the statement pursuant to sub-rule 89 (C)."' The Trial Chamber, ac-
knowledging that Haskic neither made the statement under oath nor subject
to cross-examination, remarked that such factors go to the weight of the evi-
dence and not its admissibility. 2 '
Kordic sought leave to pursue an interlocutory appeal on the matter, tar-
geting the Trial Chamber's use of sub-rule 89(C)."6 According to the ac-
cused, the Trial Chamber had "arrogate[d] to itself the absolute discretion
under Rule 89(C) to admit any evidence 'which it deems to have probative
value,' while at the same discarding... the fundamental right of an accused
person to confront and have cross-examined the witnesses against him."" 7
Kordic further attributed the decision to the Tribunal's "understandable
search for efficiency, streamlined procedures and swifter justice," but main-
tained that, in so doing, the Tribunal "must not allow itself to lose sight of
one of the most fundamental protections afforded to those who stand ac-
cused of crimes.''2 Kordic further alleged that "the Prosecution is seeking to
123. Kordic Deceased Witness Decision, supra note 119, 1[ 5. Although the Prosecution's
May 1999 attempt to admit the statement was unsuccessful, the Court left open the possibility
of admission at a later date. Id. The parties continued to dispute the matter, along with the
proposed admission of additional written statements attributed to other unavailable or unwill-
ing witnesses, via written submissions until the Trial Chamber finally admitted the statement
in an oral ruling on February 21, 2000. Id.
124. Id. 6. Sub-rule 89(C) provides that "a Chamber may admit any relevant evidence
which it deems to have probative value." ICTY RPE, supra note 2, at R. 89(C).
125. Kordic Deceased Witness Decision, supra note 119, 6. The Trial Chamber rea-
soned that:
The real issue is this: Should this statement be admitted un-cross-examined, so that
the Defence have had no chance to test it, we have come to the conclusion that it
would be wrong to deny the Chamber this statement simply on that technical
ground. That goes very much to the matter of weight.
Trial Transcript at 14,701, Prosecutor v. Kordic, ICTY Case No. IT-95-14/2-T (Feb. 21,
2000). The admission was tempered by the Trial Chamber's acknowledgment that, in accord
with the jurisprudence of the European Court of Human Rights, "it would not be possible to
convict the accused on the basis of this statement alone if the evidence is uncorroborated." Id.
at 14,702.
126. See Kordic Deceased Witness Decision, supra note 119, 10.
127. Accused Dario Kordic's Application for Leave to Pursue an Interlocutory Appeal of
a February 21, 2000 Ruing of the Trial Chamber to Admit into Evidence a Prior Unswom,
Uncorroborated Witness Statement Whose Maker Mr. Kordic Could Neither Confront Nor
Cross-Examine, at 14, ICTY Case No. IT-95-14/2 (Feb. 28, 2000) [hereinafter Kordic Appli-
cation for Leave] (emphasis in original). The right of examination is conferred upon the ac-
cused pursuant to the Statute:
In the determination of any charge against the accused pursuant to the present
Statute, the accused shall be entitled to the following minimum guarantees, in full
equality... (e) to examine, or have examined, the witnesses against him and to
obtain the attendance and examination of witnesses on his behalf under the same
conditions as witnesses against him.
Statute, supra note 1, art. 21(4)(e).
128. Kordic Application for Leave, supra note 127, at 14. The right of the accused to
confront the witnesses against him "has always been found the most effectual method for dis-
DUE PROCESS EROSION
change proceedings before the Tribunal from trials with live testimony to
'trials by uncorroborated, unsworn documents' and cautioned against the
admission of the statement vis-a-vis the proverbial slippery slope.'29
The Appeals Chamber granted Kordic's application to appeal.' In ad-
dressing his application, the Appeals Chamber observed that it was faced
with the question of whether the "unsworn, uncross-examined, out-of-court
statement of a deceased witness should have been admitted into evidence as
the only proof of the accused's presence in a particular place at a particular
time."'' Arguably, the manner in which the Appeals Chamber framed the
decision was telling with regard to its likely outcome.
At the outset, the Appeals Chamber confirmed the Tribunal's preference
for live testimony and cited four exceptions to the general rule of direct evi-
dence."' Noting that the statement at issue failed to fall within the parame-
ters of any of the delineated exceptions, the Appeals Chamber then ad-
dressed the issue of sub-rule 89(C). The Appeals Chamber acknowledged
that the sub-rule confers broad discretion upon the Trial Chambers, but also
noted that such discretion is not unfettered and that employment of the pro-
vision ought "to be in harmony with the Statute and the other Rules to the
greatest extent possible."'3
Consequently, the Appeals Chamber observed that, of the four excep-
tions to direct testimony, three, by right, provide for cross-examination and
the fourth, Rule 94 ter, contains "strict procedural protections. "" Accord-
ingly, statements admitted pursuant to Rule 89(C) must also be subject to
safeguards that will ensure reliability. 35 Because Haskic did not give his
covering the truth." David Lusty, Anonymous Accusers: An Historical and Comparative
Analysis of Secret Witnesses in Criminal Trials, 24 SYDNEY L. REV. 361, 373 (citing Duke of
Dorset v. Girdler, 24 E.R. 238 (1720)). This ability to so test evidence was observed to be
"the greatest legal engine ever invented for the discovery of truth." Id. at 362 (quoting J.H.
WIGMORE, A TREATISE IN THE ANGLO-AMERICAN SYSTEM OF EVIDENCE IN TRIALS AT COMMON
LAW §1367, at 29 (1940)).
129. Kordic Application for Leave, supra note 127, at 13. According to the accused, the
admission of the statement would open the door for the admission of further written state-
ments of the unavailable, unwilling or even for the sake of convenience. Id.
130. See Prosecutor v. Kordic, ICTY Case No. IT-95-14/2-AR73.5 (Mar. 28, 2000) (de-
cision in the Appellate Chamber on application for leave to appeal and scheduling order).
131. Kordic Deceased Witness Decision, supra note 119, 18. The contents of the
statement were also not corroborated by any other evidence. Id. 27.
132. The exceptions addressed were that of deposition testimony, testimony by video-
conference link, expert witness statements and the submission of affidavit evidence pursuant
to Rule 94 ter. Id. 1 19.
133. Id. 120.
134. Id. 21. According to the Appeals Chamber, the procedural protections contained
in Rule 94 ter are threefold. Id. The statements are to be used to corroborate a fact in dispute
contained in the live testimony of another witness, the proffered statements must have been
executed in accord with the law and procedure of the State in which they were signed and the
Trial Chamber may order, or rule in response to a party's objection, that the witness be called
for cross-examination. Id.
135. "[I]t would be odd to find that a statement that met none of the requirements of
those other rules was nonetheless admissible under Rule 89(C) without any other compensat-
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statement under oath, was not subject to cross-examination, and his testi-
mony appeared to be uncorroborated, the Appeals Chamber observed an ab-
sence of any indicia of reliability. This finding, according to the Court, was
exacerbated by the fact that the Haskic statement was not "first-hand" but
rather "more removed" hearsay, and "multiple translations in an informal
setting" occurred in its taking. 36 As a result, rather than finding the statement
inadmissible under sub-rule 89(D),' 31 the Appeals Chamber found that the
statement was "so lacking in reliability that it should have been excluded as
without probative value" under Rule 89(C). 138
B. Seven Affidavits and One Formal Statement
Offered Pursuant to Rule 94 ter
Kordic's difficulties with written testimony did not stop at the Haskic
statement, however. Perhaps inspired by the Trial Chamber's willingness to
admit the deceased witness' statement, the Prosecution also attempted to en-
ter into evidence seven affidavits pursuant to Rule 94 ter'39 and one formal
statement claiming, as authority for its proffer, either Rule 94 ter or the pro-
visions of sub-rule 89(C).'" One of the primary points at issue regarding the
admission of the statements was non-compliance with the time constraints
imposed by Rule 94 ter. The Prosecution admitted that it had not filed the
statements at issue before calling a witness whose testimony the statements
ing evidence of reliability." Id. 91 22. Though recognizing the Tribunal's admission of hearsay
evidence throughout its analysis, the Appeals Chamber clearly acknowledged that cross-
examination enhances reliability. Id. 9191 23-27. The Court further notes that admission of the
statement "is in marked tension with the guarantee in Article 21(4) that the accused has the
right to examine the witnesses against him." Id. 1 23.
136. The statement was taken by a native Dutch speaker, translated from Croatian into
written English by an interpreter and then orally translated back into Croatian to obtain the
witness' signature. Id. 91 27. Judge Patricia Wald, the presiding judge in this instance, subse-
quently remarked on scenarios such as these stating, "[tihere is much margin for error in such
a system, and indeed in the courtroom years later, many witnesses say they were misunder-
stood or misquoted in the earlier statement." Wald, supra note 25, at 551.
137. "A Chamber may exclude evidence if its probative value is substantially out-
weighed by the need to ensure a fair trial." See ICTY RPE, supra note 2, at R. 89(D).
138. Kordic Deceased Witness Decision, supra note 119, 1 28. In reaching this decision,
the Appeals Chamber noted that the "reliability of a statement is relevant to its admissibility
and not just to its weight." Id. 91 24. This holding is consistent with the theory espoused by the
Trial Chamber in Prosecutor v. Delalic, ICTY Case No. IT-96-21-T, 32 (Jan. 19, 1998) (de-
cision on motion of Prosecution for admissibility of evidence) (remarking that, "reliability is
the invisible golden thread which runs through all the components of admissibility"). How-
ever, the appellate decision has been criticized by a member of the Tribunal who, in fact, pre-
sided over the Kordic matter at Trial Chambers. In the opinion of Judge May, the appellate
decision should rather have been based on a finding by the Appeals Chamber that the proba-
tive value of the statement was substantially outweighed by the need to ensure a fair trial.
RICHARD MAY & MARIEKE WIERDA, INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL EVIDENCE 226 (2002).
139. See ICTY RPE revision 17, supra note 114, R. 94 ter.
140. Kordic Seven Affidavits Decision, supra note 113,914.
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were meant to corroborate, as required by the Rule.'" A second point of con-
tention was the appropriate meaning to ascribe to Rule 94 ter's phrase "fact
in dispute." The Prosecution called for a broad reading of the phrase; ' 2 the
defense maintained that "because it is an exception to the general preference
in Rule 90 for live testimony, the requirement that an affidavit should cor-
roborate a live witness's testimony as to a specific "fact in dispute" should
be interpreted restrictively."'
4 3
The Trial Chamber admitted all of the affidavits despite the lack of
compliance with the timing provisions of Rule 94 ter. The Trial Chamber
deemed the tardiness of the submissions to be a mere technical breach. 44 In
making this determination, the Trial Chamber noted that: "[T]he rules must
be interpreted to give them useful effect."'4 Further, the Trial Chamber
agreed with the Prosecution's interpretation of "facts in dispute" and held
that the limiting phrase should be interpreted broadly.'" Inexplicably, the
Trial Chamber also found the formal statement admissible pursuant to Rule
94 ter,47 though its purpose was not to prove a fact in dispute, in corrobora-
tion of witness testimony, but rather to supplement the prior testimony of a
live witness.'
Appealing from the Trial Chamber's ruling, Kordic argued, inter alia,
that the admission of the statements clearly violated the requirements of
Rule 94 ter.4 9 Kordic alleged that the admission of the statements thus con-
stituted an abrogation of the Court's responsibility to ensure that its proceed-
141. Citing "practical problems," the Prosecution conceded that it had not adhered to the
timing requirements of Rule 94 ter. Trial Transcript at 16,481-16,482, Prosecutor v. Kordic,
ICTY Case No. IT-95-14/2-T (Mar. 10, 2000). The Prosecution's failure to so comply was
attributed to difficulties faced by it in finding "a procedure suitable for the national authorities
in Bosnia." Id. at 16,481. Disturbingly, it appears possible that the Prosecution could have
complied with the timing provisions, but did not as a matter of trial strategy. In recapping the
arguments of the parties at the Trial Chamber level, Judge May, though mistakenly attributing
the statement to the defense, notes that an argument was made to the effect that complying
with the timing requirements would have necessitated holding back important witnesses "until
virtually the end of the case." Id. at 16,486.
142. "The Prosecution... say[s]... that the term of 'fact in dispute' should be given a
broad interpretation." Id. at 16,488.
143. Kordic Seven Affidavits Decision, supra note 113, 12.
144. According to the Trial Chamber, the timing requirement of 94 ter was merely of a
formal, procedural nature and to decide otherwise could defeat the interests of justice. Id. 9.
The affidavits, in fact, were submitted at the end of the Prosecution's case, "in some cases
months after the live testimony which they were supposed to corroborate had concluded." Id.
1 31.
145. Id. 123.
146. Id. 9.
147. Id.
148. Id. The Appeals Chamber ultimately found that the statement could not be so admit-
ted and that the only possible mechanism for introduction of the statement would have been
sub-rule 89(C). Id. 47. Observing that the Prosecution failed to provide detailed submissions
regarding the same, the Court limited its ruling to the fact that the Trial Chamber erred by
admitting the statement under Rule 94 ter. Id. 11 43-48.
149. Id. 1 10.
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ings comply with the Rules of the Tribunal.5 Kordic took issue with the
finding of the Trial Chamber that the time constraints imposed by Rule 94
ter were of a technical nature only. He averred that "the timing requirement
[is] intended to afford the opposing party the opportunity to test not only the
credibility of the subsequent live witness but also the truthfulness and accu-
racy of the statements contained in the affidavit."'5 Kordic further main-
tained that the Trial Chamber erred in its expansive interpretation of the term
"facts in dispute."'
52
In rendering its decision, the Appeals Chamber acknowledged that
Rule 94 ter was instituted for the purpose of expediting the Tribunal's pro-
ceedings, but noted that the "desire for expedition is... constrained by the
need to protect the rights of an accused."'53 The Appeals Chamber then reit-
erated its finding in Kordic's prior appeal, namely, that "Rule 94 ter... in-
cludes strict procedural protections."' 5 4 In accord with the position put forth
by the defense, the Appeals Chamber found that the time constraints in the
rule played an integral role with regard to these protections'5 and, conse-
quently, reversed the Trial Chamber decision. 56 The Appeals Chamber also
addressed the issue of the proper interpretation to be given to the phrase
"fact in dispute," holding that "a clear link must be established between the
testimony and the affidavit and the corroborating evidence must be focused
on the facts contained in the live testimony and not on the surrounding
events of the case in general."'57
X. THE AFrERMATH OF THE KORDIC APPEALS
The Appeals Chamber rendered these two decisions on interlocutory
appeal in July and September of 2000, respectively. The rulings maintained
150. "[B]y admitting the Statements in derogation of the plain terms of Rule 94 ter, the
Trial Chamber abrogated its responsibility to ensure that trial proceedings are conducted in
accordance with the Rules." Id. 12.
151. Id.
152. Id. 12.
153. Id. 125.
154. Id. 26 (emphasis in original) (noting the first of these protections is that the state-
ments admitted pursuant to it "be used to corroborate a fact in dispute contained in the live
testimony of another witness").
155. The Appeals Chamber determined that the timing requirement was an integral and
fundamental part of the rule:
It ensures that a party is informed of the facts in question and in doing so enables
them to cross-examine the future live witness ... challenging both the credibility
of the live witness together with the truthfulness and accuracy of the statements
contained in the affidavits.
Id. 31. Further, the Appeals Chamber noted: "The terms of Rule 94 ter should not be ex-
tended so that it becomes a general mechanism by which a party may file unchallenged affi-
davit evidence to support oral testimony which has already concluded." Id. 33.
156. Id. 34.
157. Id. 140.
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the importance of direct testimony, highlighted the value of cross-
examination and informed the lower courts of the need to comply strictly
with the procedural protections present in the Rules. The decisions thus ap-
peared to represent a victory not only for Kordic, but also for others appear-
ing accused before the Tribunal. In addition, the rulings could very well have
served to dispute criticisms that the Tribunal was "carrying out its work in a
manner that disregards the rights of accused persons."'
The Tribunal's reaction to the decisions, however, was swift. At the
twenty-third session of the plenary, 29 November - 1 December 2000, they
deleted Rule 94 ter and, in its stead, put in place Rule 92 bis."9 The Tribu-
nal's Eighth Annual Report (2001) addressed the deletion of the rule govern-
ing affidavit testimony only briefly, noting the difficulties experienced with
the same due to the fact that clear rules governing affidavits did not exist
within the law of the former Yugoslavia."w Although the Working Group's
consequent recommendation was for amendment of the rule, without further
elaboration, the Tribunal omitted the rule."" The deletion of Rule 94 ter and
its replacement with Rule 92 bis, in the aftermath of the Kordic Decisions on
Interlocutory Appeal, provide evidence, according to one critic, that "the
Tribunal is not bound to its procedure in any meaningful sense. '62
In its Eighth Annual Report, the Tribunal makes no mention of the pro-
ceedings at Nuremberg or Tokyo. While just two years earlier, the Tribunal
proudly distinguished itself from its predecessors and averred its procedural
commitment to "the rights of the accused... in accordance with contempo-
rary human rights norms,"163 such declarations were notably absent from the
later report. The reasoning for this may be attributed to the fact that the
158. Boas, The Principle of Flexibility, supra note 16, at 48 (noting that the fair trial
rights of the accused must be maintained in order that the Tribunal not be seen as a "proce-
dural pirate").
159. Eighth Annual Report of the International Tribunal for the Prosecution of Persons
Responsible for Serious Violations of International Humanitarian Law Committed in the Ter-
ritory of the Former Yugoslavia Since 1991, U.N. GAOR, 56th Sess., Provisional Agenda
Item 53, 51, U.N. Doc. A/561352-S/2001/865 (2001) [hereinafter Eighth Ann. Rep.] (noting
that of the four new rules created, the most significant was Rule 92 bis and that the rule "pro-
vides a framework for the admission of formal written statements and transcripts ... at the
discretion of the Trial Chamber"). Rule 92 bis is discussed in detail infra, Part XI.
160. Eighth Ann. Rep., supra note 159, 1 55. This difficulty was acknowledged by the
Prosecution in the Kordic case. See Kordic Seven Affidavits Decision, supra note 113, 1 4.
Similar difficulties were noted in the cases of accused Martinovic and Naletilic. Seventh Ann.
Rep., supra note 87, 40.
161. Eighth Ann. Rep., supra note 159, 55.
162. Cristian DeFrancia, Due Process in International Criminal Courts: Why Procedure
Matters, 87 VA. L. REV. 1381, 1430 (2001). "Where Appeals Chamber judgments frustrate
the Trial Chamber's desire to admit any manner of written statement, the fact that they can
simply change the rules to accommodate the interests of a lower standard offends the basic
procedural integrity of the institution." Id. at 1431. In contrast, Judge May referred to Rule 94
ter as "a short-lived experiment for the admission of affidavits." MAY & WIERDA, supra note
138, at 217.
163. Sixth Ann. Rep., supra note 61, 13.
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twenty-third session of the plenary was a noteworthy one, not only for its de-
letion of Rule 94 ter, but also because the plenary proceedings marked the
end of the Tribunal's preference for live testimony. Although one might con-
sider such a revision to be monumental (the obviation of a long-standing pol-
icy that, according to the Tribunal itself, served to bolster the integrity of its
proceedings), the conversion only merited a mention in a footnote of the An-
nual Report.'" New Sub-rule 89(F), which establishes a "no preference al-
ternative," likewise finds its only mention in the same note."
Unlike the Tribunal's subdued "description" of this turn of events, many
have recognized the modification as extreme. Noted to be a "dramatic
change in the way in which evidence is to be received by the Iinternational
[sic] Tribunal,' "the "revisions represent a 180 degree turn from earlier
emphasis on the 'principle' of live testimony."167 Further, the Tribunal
adopted the revisions "not without some dissent."'68
XI. RULE 92 BIS
Rule 92 bis contains detailed provisions that provide for the introduction
of written evidence. Pursuant to the rule, parties may submit evidence in the
form of written statements (declared and verified in a form prescribed by the
rule), written statements by unavailable declarants (un-sworn and in no
specified form) and transcripts from prior proceedings before the Tribunal.69
In the first case to address the application of Rule 92 bis,'70 the Trial Cham-
ber noted that the intent of the rule was "to try and cut down the lengths of
these trials.... [A] large amount of time in this Tribunal has been taken up
with pointless and repetitive cross-examination, and this Rule is aimed at
dealing with it."' 7 ' Accordingly, the rule "clearly evinces the trend towards
broader resort to the admission of written evidence."',
164. Eighth Ann. Rep., supra note 159, 51 n.. The note is appended to the statement
indicating Rule 94 ter's replacement by Rule 92 bis. Id. 51.
165. The note reads: "Paragraph (F) of rule 89 was created providing for the Chamber to
receive the evidence of a witness in written form, where the interests of justice allow. This
changes the previous position under paragraph (A) of rule 90 (now deleted), which had stated
a preference for oral testimony." Id. f 51 n. 1. The new rule provides: "A Chamber may re-
ceive the evidence of a witness orally or, where the interests of justice allow, in written form."
ICTY RPE revision 28, supra note 2, at R. 89(F).
166. Boas, The Principle of Flexibility, supra note 16, at 48.
167. Wald, supra note 25, at 548 (noting that Rule 89(F) states a "counter-principle" to
the Tribunal's "distinct preference for live witness testimony").
168. Id.
169. See ICTY RPE revision 28, supra note 2, at R. 92 bis.
170. See Ryneveld & Mundis, supra note 59, at 55.
171. Trial Transcript at 2441, Prosecutor v. Sikirica, ICTY Case No. IT-95-8-T (Apr. 24,
2001).
172. SALVATORE ZAPPALA, HUMAN RIGHTS IN INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL PROCEEDINGS
138 (2003).
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Rule 92 bis is divided into five parts. Its first part (section (A)) confers
authority upon a Trial Chamber to admit into evidence a written statement
"which goes to proof of a matter other than the acts and conduct of the ac-
cused as charged in the indictment."'' Section (A) also provides a non-
exhaustive list of factors in favor of and against the admission of such evi-
dence.' 4 Section (B) (the second section) addresses the difficulty noted by
the Tribunal regarding the application of Rule 94 ter. Section (B) provides
that written statements shall be admissible, pursuant to Rule 92 bis, if a dec-
laration, appropriately witnessed and attesting to its accuracy, is attached to
each statement.' The third section of the rule applies in the case of written
statements that do not meet the technical requirements of Section (B). The
application of the third section is limited to statements made by presently
unavailable declarants, namely individuals who, since making the state-
ments, have died, gone missing, or have become unable to testify due to a
mental or physical infirmity. The section requires that admission of such a
statement be predicated upon a finding that the statement was made and re-
corded under circumstances that provide "satisfactory indicia of its reliabil-
ity." 76 The fourth section (Section (D) of the Rule) provides for the admis-
sion of witness testimony in the form of a transcript from a prior proceeding
of the Tribunal, "which goes to proof of a matter other than the acts and
conduct of the accused."'77 The final section provides that a party availing
itself of the Rule must provide notice to the opposing party and that the non-
moving party may object within seven days of receipt of notice. After hear-
ing from both parties, it is in the discretion of the Trial Chamber to deter-
mine "whether to admit the statement or transcript in whole or in part and
whether to require the witness to appear for cross-examination."'7
Thus, the Rule, unlike its predecessor, does not provide the assurance of
any type of cross-examination with regard to the content of the written
statements admitted pursuant to it. In addition, the Rule does not limit the
content of such statements to that which will be, or even has been, corrobo-
rated by a live witness. Of course, one of the main guarantees for the rights
of the accused under the Rule may be found in its requirement that an admit-
ted statement "[go] to proof of a matter other than the acts and conduct of
173. See ICTYRPE revision 28, supra note 2, at R. 92 bis (A).
174. Id.
175. The section also specifies the procedure that is to be followed in making the decla-
ration. Id. at R. 92 bis (B).
176. Id. at R. 92 bis (C) (emphasis added). This section has thus been adjudged by one
member of the Tribunal as a codification of the Kordic Deceased Witness Decision. See MAY
& WIERDA, supra note 138, at 226. See also Boas, The Principle of Flexibility, supra note 16,
at 81.
177. ICTY RPE revision 28, supra note 2, at R. 92 bis (D). The practice of admitting
transcripts of prior testimony as evidence is one that existed prior to the creation of the rule.
As such, "the creation of Rule 92 bis (D) was not a foray into virgin terrain." Boas, Develop-
ments, supra note 58, at 179.
178. ICTY RPE revision 28, supra note 2, at R. 92 bis (E).
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the accused as charged in the indictment."'79 However, the value of such a
guarantee depends entirely upon the manner in which one interprets the
phrase.' As an initial matter, one could argue that the phrase does not pre-
clude the use of witness statements that bear upon the acts or conduct of the
accused, so long as the statements also go to proof of another matter. 8' Al-
though the Tribunal seems to consistently read the rule as allowing a witness
statement "so long as it does not go to proof of the conduct or acts of the ac-
cused,"'82 it is worth mentioning that this is not a literal interpretation of the
Rule.
XII. BACKGROUND OR BACKDOOR?
A. The Sikirica Case (Rule 92 bis (D))
Upon implementation of Rule 92 bis, the Tribunal averred that "[t]he
purpose of the rule is to facilitate the admission by way of written statement
of peripheral or background evidence in order to expedite proceedings while
protecting the rights of the accused under the Statute.""' 3 This pronounce-
ment is arguably akin to what, in the domestic context, most know as "legis-
lative intent." The need for such a rule, particularly with regard to evidence
such as that which "relates to relevant historical, political or military back-
ground,""' is arguably necessary in light of the unique context of the Tribu-
nal." While such a limitation would not obviate an argument for cross-
examination," 6 if so applied, evidence admitted pursuant to the Rule would
likely not run afoul of the personal preference espoused by one member of
the Tribunal: "it is.. . essential .... that any written statements truly be lim-
179. ZAPPALA, supra note 172, at 138.
180. See Boas, The Principle of Flexibility, supra note 16, at 82 (noting that "the inter-
pretation of what constitutes the 'acts and conduct of the accused' will be pivotal to the fair
and effective application of the Rule").
181. This is somewhat analogous to a frequent experience in common law systems: the
admission of, for the proof of something other than the matter asserted, a statement that would
otherwise be hearsay. See, e.g., Fed. R. Evid. 801.
182. Wald, supra note 25, at 548 (emphasis added).
183. Eighth Ann. Rep., supra note 159, 51 (emphasis added).
184. This quality of evidence, pursuant to the Rule, is to be considered by a Trial Cham-
ber as favorable with regard to admission. ICTY RPE revision 28, supra note 2, at R. 92 bis
(A)(i)(b). Among other factors in favor of admission are circumstances in which the evidence
is cumulative or "consists of general or statistical analysis of the ethnic composition of the
population in the places to which the indictment relates." Id. at R. 92 bis (A)(i)(a), (c).
185. "A trial at the ICTY is usually more akin to documenting an episode or even an era
of national or ethnic conflict rather than proving a single discrete incident." Wald, supra note
25, at 536-37.
186. See, e.g., id. at 550 (noting that "even when the written testimony is concededly
background or jurisdictional, defendants can be expected to raise the core issue of whether
written testimony not subject to cross-examination violates the ICTY statutory Article 21
mandate that the accused be allowed to question witnesses against him").
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ited to non-incriminating evidence."'' 7 The jurisprudence of the Tribunal re-
veals that in practice, however, the application of the rule has not been so
limited.
Less than four months after Rule 92 bis came into effect,' 8 the Prosecu-
tion sought, and was granted, the opportunity to admit transcript testimony
in the case of Prosecutor v. Sikirica.'89 While the Trial Chamber briefly ad-
dressed the issue of admissibility regarding evidence proffered pursuant to
Rule 92 bis,'9° the decision focused primarily on the Trial Chamber's deter-
minations regarding whether to afford an opportunity for cross-examination
of each of the witnesses whose testimony the Trial Chamber had admitted.
The analysis employed by the Trial Chamber is quite telling with regard to
the manner in which it used the Rule in that case.
According to the Trial Chamber, in determining whether a witness,
whose statement has been admitted pursuant to Rule 92 bis, should be re-
quired to appear for cross-examination, "among the matters for consideration
[is] whether the transcript goes to proof of a critical element of the Prosecu-
tion's case. ' This declaration is immediately troubling. While such an as-
sessment is certainly relevant with regard to the statutory right of the ac-
cused to examine the witnesses against him, it reveals a use of Rule 92 bis
that is wholly irreconcilable with the Tribunal's assertion regarding its pur-
pose, namely the expeditious introduction of background or peripheral evi-
dence.
Throughout the Trial Chamber's analysis in this regard, the Court ad-
dressed each of the six transcripts of prior testimony. Though the Trial
Chamber admitted all six, only the content of half are capable of falling
within these "innocuous" parameters." The Trial Chamber noted two of the
remaining admitted statements, respectively, as capable of "[constituting] a
means of proof of an element of the genocide charge against the accused"'9
and "capable of going towards the proof of the crime of genocide with which
Mr. Sikirica is charged."'94 The Trial Chamber found that a third transcript of
testimony, also admitted pursuant to Rule 92 bis, related to the cases of all
187. Id. at 551.
188. The Rule became active pursuant to U.N. Doc. IT/183, an official document of the
ICTY, on January 19, 2001. Eighth Ann. Rep., supra note 159, 51.
189. Prosecutor v. Sikirica, ICTY Case No. IT-95-8 (May 23, 2001) (decision in the
Trial Chamber on Prosecutor's application to admit transcripts under Rule 92 bis). Though the
motion was originally granted orally on May 2, 2001, Trial Chamber III later supplied its rea-
sons for so ruling in this written decision. Id. at Introduction.
190. Specifically, the Trial Chamber noted that evidence admitted pursuant to the rule
must also meet the requirements of Rule 89(C) and (D); that is, the evidence must have proba-
tive value and that the same must not be outweighed by the need to ensure a fair trial. Id. 3.
191. Id. 1 4 (emphasis added).
192. One transcript testimony was noted to provide "helpful background material." Id.
16. Another, pertaining to a witness referred to as "an expert historian," was noted to provide
"a helpful overview of events." Id. 1 30.
193. Id. I 11.
194. Id. 1 21.
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three accused in a "significant and direct way."'"" Thus, the use of Rule 92
bis in Sikirica, as evidenced in "the first reasoned decision on the new
Rule,'1 96 gives no heed to the Tribunal's original contention regarding the
purpose of the Rule. Rather than prove to be an anomaly, however, this ap-
plication arguably set the stage for future employment of the Rule.
B. The Milosevic Case (Rule 92 bis (A))
The following year, in Prosecutor v. Milosevic, the prosecution sought
to admit twenty-three written statements pursuant to Rule 92 bis (A)."l Spe-
cifically, the Prosecution tendered statements regarding events such as at-
tacks, killings and assaults in Kosovo, events that constitute the widespread
or systematic campaign of terror and violence that the Prosecution charged
the accused with having committed."' According to the Prosecution, such
statements ought to be admissible as a "crime base"; further, the evidence
complies with the standard set in the Rule, as the statements pertain to
crimes committed in Kosovo, but not to the acts and conduct of the ac-
cused.'" In its decision on the matter, the Trial Chamber evaluated the mean-
ing of the term "acts and conduct of the accused" in order to determine, in
accord with the Rule, that which can and cannot be submitted into evidence
in written form. In its assessment, the Trial Chamber noted that:
The phrase "acts and conduct of the accused" in Rule 92 bis is a plain ex-
pression and should be given its ordinary meaning: deeds and behaviour of
the accused. It should not be extended by fanciful interpretation. No men-
tion is made of acts and conduct by alleged co-perpetrators, subordinates
or, indeed, of anybody else. Had the rule been intended to extend to acts
and conduct of alleged co-perpetrators or subordinates it would have said
SO.200
195. Id. 135.
196. Boas, Developments, supra note 58, at 177.
197. Prosecutor v. Milosevic, ICTY Case No. IT-02-54, I (Mar. 21, 2002) (decision in
the Trial Chamber on Prosecution's request to have written statements admitted under Rule
92 bis) [hereinafter Milosevic Decision]. Drawing on the limited jurisprudence of the Tribu-
nal regarding the use of the Rule, the Trial Chamber cited the decision in Sikirica along with
that of Prosecutor v. Brdjanin. Id. V 6-8 (noting that, in the latter case, the Court strictly con-
strued the limitation on evidence admitted pursuant to Rule 92 bis regardless of its repetitious
nature, that evidence which fits within the parameters of the Rule is still subject to the Court's
discretion regarding admissibility, and that the Trial Chamber would exercise extreme caution
before admitting statements going to the act and cunduct of subordinates in cases involving
alleged superior responsibility). Lengthy arguments regarding procedural issues, including the
conditions governing the application of Rule 92 bis were noted by the Tribunal to be a promi-
nent feature of the Brdjanin trial. Ninth Ann. Rep., supra note 51, 76.
198. Milosevic Decision, supra note 197, 16-18.
199. Id. I l0.
200. Id. 1 22.
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Thus, albeit with the right of cross-examination, the Trial Chamber ad-
mitted the statements into evidence."0 ' In light of the decision of the Trial
Chamber, an argument against admission and calling to mind the "legislative
intent" behind the introduction of the rule, that it be used to establish that
which is background or peripheral, would somehow fall within the category
of "fanciful interpretation." The finding by the Trial Chamber, of course,
does not have binding force on the decisions of the other Trial Chambers."
The Appeals Chamber, an entity whose decisions do have such binding ef-
fect, 3 however, has since addressed the matter in a similar manner.
C. The Appellate Decision (Rule 92 bis (C))
In the case of Prosecutor v. Galic, the prosecution introduced into evi-
dence, pursuant to Rule 92 bis (C), the statements of two witnesses, since
deceased.' Granting an interlocutory appeal with regard to one of the state-
ments, the Appeals Chamber favorably cites the Milosevic 92 bis decision,
concerning the acts of co-perpetrators and subordinates. 2' Far from deter-
mining that the rule is in any way meant to be limited to evidence of a back-
ground or peripheral nature, the decision arguably expands the application of
the Rule beyond that which is delineated in the prior Trial Chamber deci-
sions. The decision observes that parties may use 92 bis statements to estab-
lish the acts and conducts of others.' ° Parties may then use such acts and
conduct to establish the state of mind of the accused.2'
According to the Appeals Chamber:
[w]here the evidence is so pivotal to the Prosecution case, and where the
person whose acts and conduct the written statement describes is so
proximate to the accused, the Trial Chamber may decide that it would not
be fair to the accused to permit the evidence to be given in written form.2 8
201. ld. 127.
202. Prosecutor v. Aleksovski, ICTY Case No. IT-95-14/1-A, 114 (Mar. 24, 2000)
(Judgment in the Appeals Chamber) (noting, however, that the Trial Chambers are free to fol-
low the decisions of one another).
203. According to the Appeals Chamber, "a proper construction of the Statute requires
that the ratio decidendi of its decisions is binding on Trial Chambers." Id. 113.
204. See Prosecutor v. Galic, ICTY Case No. IT-98-29-AR73.2, at 1 (June 7, 2002)
(ICTY Judicial Supplement No. 34, decision on interlocutory appeal concerning Rule 92 bis
(C) [hereinafter Judicial Supplement 34].
205. The appellate decision also elaborates on the same. Id. at 2 (detailing that which
falls within the confines of "acts and conduct of the accused," namely evidence that goes to
the actus reus or mens rea of the accused and, additionally, evidence "that he was a superior
to those who actually did commit the crimes").
206. Judicial Supplement 34, supra note 204, at 1.
207. See Daryl A. Mundis, Current Developments at the ad hoc International Criminal
Tribunals, 1 J. INT'L CRBM. JUST. 197, 218 (2003) (commenting on the Galic decision).
208. Judicial Supplement 34, supra note 204, at 3 (emphasis added).
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In a like manner, although noting "the short step,""z in cases of command
responsibility, between the acts constituting the crime charged and a finding
that the accused knew or had reason to know of the same, the decision leaves
open the door for the introduction of such statements under the Rule, even
when the declarant is unavailable."' That these interpretations of the Rule
are a far cry from its "original purpose" is evident. It is further worth noting,
however, that the admission of such statements without cross-examination,
as the decision suggests, and as the Rule allows, runs contrary even to the
precedent established at Nuremberg."'
One could certainly argue that a parallel exists between the legal analy-
sis present in the aforementioned decisions interpreting Rule 92 bis and that
found in the appellate decisions in the Kordic matters. Each of the decisions
employs a strict interpretation of the rule under consideration. The outcome
of the decisions, vis-i-vis the rights of the accused, is solely dependent upon
the content of the relevant rule, and therein lies the difference in the results.
In the Kordic decisions, assessing the application of Rule 94 ter necessarily
involved the procedural safeguards within the Rule and, thus, served to inure
to the benefit of the accused. By comparison, it is fair to say that the proce-
dural safeguards in Rule 92 bis are more minimal and that the rights of the
accused are more vigilantly addressed in the non-binding rhetoric of the Tri-
bunal's Eighth Annual Report than in the Rule itself. Thus, a strict applica-
tion of the rule has the tendency to impinge upon the rights of the accused
rather than bolster them.
It cannot be sufficiently stressed that, in adopting Rule 92 bis, the Tri-
bunal contended that the rule would be used to establish background or pe-
ripheral evidence. The Tribunal's Annual Reports are not simply missives to
the international community. Rather, the Tribunal is statutorily required to
submit the reports to the Security Council and the General Assembly. "' Ob-
viously, the purpose of such reports is to keep the two U.N. organs abreast of
the Tribunal's activities. Inherently then, one of the functions of the reports
is to provide a means of assuring that the Tribunal is acting in a manner that
is consistent with the Statute as approved by the Security Council. Accord-
ingly, the reports provide a mechanism for the Security Council to ensure
that the proceedings before the Tribunal fully respect the rights of the ac-
cused as mandated in Article 20 and delineated in Article 21 of the Statute.
209. Id.
210. In such cases, the Appeals Chamber noted "it may well be" that the evidence should
not be admitted in written form or that an absence of the opportunity to cross should preclude
admission of such statements. Id. Prior to Galic, Judge Robinson expressed a contrary opinion
on the matter. In his view, if the Trial Chamber is permitted to expose the accused to liability
vis-A-vis a charge of command responsibility, "cross-examination is not at the discretion of
the Trial Chamber; it is a right of the accused." Milosevic Decision, supra note 197, (separate
opinion of Judge Patrick Robinson).
211. See, e.g., Wald, supra note 25, at 549.
212. See Statute, supra note 1, art. 34.
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The failure to remain true to the express intent of the Rule is exacer-
bated by the very make-up of the Tribunal. In the domestic context, when
the judiciary applies a statute or rule in a manner that is contrary to its legis-
lative intent, the legislature can respond accordingly. In the context of the
Tribunal, such an avenue simply does not exist."3 In view of this, the asser-
tion that the judiciary's ability to draft and amend the same rules it interprets
is "disturbing," calls into question its ability to be impartial, and enables it to
act arbitrarily, is perhaps not a surprising one." ' A related additional cause
for concern is the nearly limitless discretion conferred upon the Trial Cham-
bers in the employment of the Rule.' 5 Inherent in this enhanced discretion is
the fact that determinations made by a Trial Chamber would likely only be
reversed if the decision at issue evidences a clear abuse of discretion,"6 a fact
that conceivably may not bode well vis-t-vis the fair trial rights of the ac-
cused.
XIII. THE FUTURE OF WRITTEN TESTIMONY AT THE TRIBUNAL
Rule 92 bis "appears to have had a dramatic impact on the way in which
parties, and in particular the Prosecution, are seeking to present their cases
before the International Tribunal."2 7 Aggressive use of the provision gives
rise to the possibility that "much of the live testimony in the prosecution
case may disappear.""2 ' Some might argue that the Tribunal's new position
213. "Since the French Revolution it has been considered a basic requirement of true
administration of justice that the separation of powers is strictly observed in legal proceed-
ings." Otto Kranzbuhler, Challenge to Nuremberg Procedures, in THE NUREMBERG WAR
CRIMES TRIAL 1945-46: A DOCUMENTARY HISTORY 248, 249 (Michael R. Marrus, ed., 1997).
214. Klip, supra note 16, at 302-03. It has also been noted that an accused has no re-
course to an appeal to a monitoring body such as the Human Rights Committee regarding an
alleged wrongdoing. "All supervisory mechanisms regarding human rights only receive com-
plaints against states." Id. at 301.
215. The Tribunal noted the "number of fundamental amendments... [which] 'reflect an
increase in the capacity of the Tribunal to fulfil its mandate more expeditiously as well as an
increase in the power of judges to control the proceedings before it."' Eighth Ann. Rep., supra
note 159, 50. The amendments at issue included the introduction of Rules 92 bis and 89(F).
Id. 151.
216. Wald, supra note 25, at 550 (noting that "the bottom line responsibility for conduct-
ing a fair trial will sit more squarely than ever with the trial court"). That the Trial Chamber
will act accordingly is not a foregone conclusion. "It is hoped that the criteria set out in para-
graph (A) of the Rule will sufficiently constrain trial chambers from allowing untested evi-
dence of direct importance to the guilt or innocence of an accused to be admitted." Boas, The
Principle of Flexibility, supra note 16, at 82.
217. Boas, Developments, supra note 58 at 176 (noting, in particular, the Prosecution's
92 bis application in the Plavsic case, which identified approximately 170 witnesses). In its
most recent report, the Tribunal observed that the rule has become increasingly implemented.
Ninth Ann. Rep., supra note 51, 289.
218. Boas, Developments, supra note 58, at 179.
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on written testimony represents a victory for the Office of the Prosecutor; 2
1 9
however, far from being satisfied with this development, the Prosecution
continues to push the envelope on the issue.
Indeed, it would be more than fair to say that the Prosecution has not
been shy in its attempts to expand upon the admission of written testimony
and that its lack of temerity in this vein continues. In April 2003, in the wake
of the Galic decision and in what is beyond any doubt the highest profile
case ever before the Tribunal, that of Milosevic, the Prosecution asked the
Trial Chamber for permission to submit the evidence-in-chief of its wit-
nesses in writing pursuant to sub-rule 89(C).22 ° This request was made in
spite of the fact that the Galic Appellate Decision clearly states that a party
cannot be permitted to tender such written statements under the Sub-rule,
thus avoiding the stringency of Rule 92 bis. 221 The decision maintains that
the purpose of Rule 92 bis was to "restrict the admissibility of this very spe-
cial type of hearsay to that which falls within its terms." '222 Consequently, the
Trial Chamber ruled against the motion, but only by majority vote.223
Judge Kwon's dissenting opinion on the matter is not only representa-
tive of the lack of unanimity amongst the judiciary regarding the issue of
written statements, it also raises a valid question about the future role of such
statements in the proceedings of the Tribunal. The basis of the dissent is ar-
guably erroneous, in that it proposes: "Rule 92 bis should be interpreted as
being applicable to the admissibility issue of written statements when they
are to be admitted without cross-examination." '224 However, Judge Kwon per-
suasively argues that Rule 89(F) is a potential vehicle for the admission of
written testimony that does not fall within the parameters of Rule 92 bis.225
219. "The Prosecutor has stated on several occasions her belief that, for expedition's
sake, more evidence should be submitted in the civil-continental written form, as opposed to
live witnesses." Wald, supra note 25, at 541.
220. See Prosecutor v. Milosevic, ICTY Case No. IT-02-54-T (Apr. 16, 2003) (decision
in the Trial Chamber on Prosecution motion for the admission of evidence-in-chief of its wit-
nesses in writing).
221. See Prosecutor v. Milosevic, ICTY Case No. IT-02-54-AR.73.2, 18(3) (Sept. 30,
2002) (decision in the Appeals Chamber on admissibility of Prosecution Investigator's evi-
dence) (summarizing the Galic Decision).
222. Id.
223. See Prosecutor v. Milosevic, ICTY Case No. IT-02-54-T (Apr. 16, 2003) (decision
in the Trial Chamber on Prosecution motion for the admission of evidence-in-chief of its wit-
nesses in writing) (Kwon, J., dissenting) [hereinafter Dissenting Opinion of Judge Kwon].
224. Id. 4. Such a reading fails to recognize the fact that Rule 92 bis specifically pro-
vides that the Trial Chamber may require the witness to appear for cross-examination. ICTY
RPE, supra note 2, at R. 92 bis (E). "[An elementary rule of interpretation [is] that one
should not construe a provision... as if it were superfluous and hence pointless .... Prose-
cutor v. Tadic, ICTY Case No. IT-94-1-A, 284 (July 15, 1999) (Judgment in the Appeals
Chamber).
225. Dissenting Opinion of Judge Kwon, supra note 223, 9 3-4.
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Of perhaps even greater importance, Judge Kwon's support for the prin-
ciple of broader admission of written statements before the Tribunal2 26 is not
a singular point of view. Judge Shahabuddeen has registered a similar opin-
ion,227 while advocating the utilization of procedures employed at Nurem-
berg, in order to enable the Tribunal to receive witness statements summa-
rized for the Court by prosecution personnel." Consequently, it appears that
the issue of written testimony before the Tribunal may well continue to find
itself in a state of flux. In light of this, and because the Tribunal "operates
largely in isolation" and is free from the oversight inherent in domestic sys-
tems of adjudication, it has been rightly noted that the Tribunal's "emerging
body of trial practices must be regularly scrutinized to assure fundamental
fairness.2 29
XIV. CONCLUSION
The Tribunal has come a long way from its initial decision to exercise a
preference for live testimony. Its transition has been inspired by the need for
expedition, both with regard to the right of the accused to a speedy trial and
at the urging of the international community. The pressures upon the Tribu-
226. See, e.g., Prosecutor v. Milosevic, ICTY Case No. IT-02-54, H 2-3 (Mar. 21, 2002)
(decision in the Trial Chamber on Prosecution's request to have written statements admitted
under Rule 92 bis) (Kwon, J., declaration).
[I]t is not entirely clear as to how the practice of the International Tribunal not to
admit witness statements as a matter of course has developed. While I appreciate
that the International Tribunal is an amalgam of the legal systems of common law
and civil law countries, I do not see the reason for limiting the circumstances in
which the written statement of a witness can be introduced into evidence before
the court.
Id.
227. See, e.g., Prosecutor v. Milosevic, ICTY Case No. IT-02-54-AR.73.2, 1 32 (Sept.
30, 2002) (decision in the Appeals Chamber on admissibility of prosecution Investigator's
evidence) (Shahabuddeen, J., partial dissenting opinion) (proffering the opinion that Rule 92
bis does not preclude recourse to Rule 89(C)) [hereinafter Partial Dissenting Opinion of Judge
Shahabuddeen]. To effectuate this position, Judge Shahabuddeen advocates that the Galic de-
cision should be overturned. Id. 38 (noting that it is permissible, in limited instances, to de-
part from prior rulings of the Appeals Chamber).
228. Id. 35. Recognizing that Nuremberg's approach has been overtaken by an increas-
ing emphasis on human rights, Judge Shahabuddeen notes "the problem at Nuremberg re-
mains, and so does the need to find a solution." Id. Although rejecting a solution that violates
fundamental norms, he contends that a balance must be struck between respecting the rights
of the accused and the public interest in ensuring that crimes are properly investigated and
duly prosecuted. Id. 36. He adds, "I do not see how both of these important public interests
can be satisfied if a decision is taken which effectively means the Trial Chamber's apprecia-
tion will rest on partial material." Id. 37.
229. Wald, supra note 25, at 537. The importance of this scrutiny was recently empha-
sized vis-a-vis Rule 92 bis, as Judge Wald admonished defense counsel that the Rule must be
vigorously policed. Patricia M. Wald, Ten Observations From the Bench About ICTY Trials:
Remarks on International Humanitarian Law Before the ICTY Conferencce (Feb. 11-12,
2002), at http://www.soros.org.ba/en/programi/pravni/ictylectures.doc.
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nal are enormous and it seems more than likely that they have served to dim
the memory of the criticisms of Nuremberg and Tokyo.
One cannot forget, however, that the judge-made Rules "essentially
amount to a code of procedure for international criminal law"230 and that the
Tribunal is "developing the common law of criminal evidence and proce-
dure."23' Should the Tribunal give in to the pressure for expediency at the in-
tegrity of its proceedings, as it seems well on its way to doing, the wrath will
be mighty, and likely more so than in the cases of Nuremberg and Tokyo.
The Tribunal's predecessors had a luxury that it does not, that of a relatively
clean slate. The international community will hold the ICTY, in turn, to a
higher standard; though it now pressures the ICTY to hurry up, it will likely
advocate in the future that the Tribunal should have learned from the mis-
takes of its forerunners. Indeed, the former Chief Prosecutor at Nuremberg,
Robert Jackson, noted, "I am consoled by the fact that in proceedings of this
novelty, errors and missteps may also be instructive to the future." '232 Accord-
ingly, it is beholden upon the Tribunal to be aware that by proceeding with
written evidence "something intangible will be lost." 
2 3
Of seminal importance, the Tribunal must be mindful that its amend-
ments to its Rules of Procedure and Evidence are in serious conflict with its
adversarial construct. Indeed, in the continental system, an investigating
judge, required to act in an independent and impartial manner, is responsible
for vetting written statements. The ICTY was not based on such a paradigm,
in part, we are told, due to the intent that its judges remain as impartial as
possible.2" However, the Tribunal continues to engage in "cafeteria inquisi-
torialism," drawing upon aspects of the process that will enable it to save
time, yet passing over the inherent procedural safeguards in the system.235
The frustration born of the amalgamation of both processes is significant.236
230. May & Wierda, supra note 29, at 735.
231. DeFrancia, supra note 162, at 1399.
232. Robert H. Jackson, Justice Jackson's Final Report to the President Concerning the
Nurenberg War Crimes Trial, in 20 TEMPLE L.Q. 338, 344 (1946-47).
233. "There is a certain moral effect produced in court upon a witness brought face to
face with the accused and ... the use of affidavits would rob the defense of the 'elusive and
incommunicable evidence of a witness' deportment while testifying."' MAY & WIERDA, supra
note 138, at 214 (citing ARNOLD BRACKMAN, THE OTHER NUREMBERG 147 (1987) (quoting
Captain Alfred W. Brooks)).
234. See Statement of the President, supra note 24.
235. With respect, Judge Shahabuddeen's observation that the Prosecutor "represents the
public interest of the international community and has to act with objectivity and fairness ap-
propriate to that circumstance," Partial Dissenting Opinion of Judge Shahabuddeen, supra
note 227, 18, does not alleviate the absence of civil law safeguards in an adversarial system.
The difficulties at the ICTY have caused one observer to remark, "[i]f the ICTY is to become
an inquisitorial proceeding along the lines of the civilist tradition, then keep to that course."
Johnson, supra note 14, at 183.
236. Indeed, the difficulties of an amalgamated system are well known. At Nuremberg,
the Chief Prosecutor was "driven close to distraction" by the "intractable problem[s]...
caused by the differences between Continental and Anglo-American criminal procedures."
TAYLOR, supra note 30, at 63.
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For as long as the Tribunal continues to employ an adversarial system, it
needs to be mindful of the needs particular to that classification, especially
the right to confront one's accusers. 37 The pressure for expedition at the
ICTY is only likely to intensify and, given the recent activity of the Tribu-
nal, one can only wonder what the future holds. It is likely time for the Tri-
bunal to revisit its roots, to be mindful that the more it aligns itself with the
system employed by its predecessors, the more likely it will be subject to
similar criticism and, of greater importance, the more likely that such criti-
cisms will be valid.
237. "[Ilt is beyond any question that the right [of confrontation] is a central and defining
feature of common law criminal procedure." Lusty, supra note 128, at 375.
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